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If a lawyer were to ask a roomful of people to name the most
important issues in the securities field since the enactment of the
federal securities laws, most would probably say something about
insider trading.' Many would mention the savings and loan crisis.2
Others would talk about the market crash of 1987, 3 penny stock
scams,4 or junk bonds.5 Virtually no one would mention one of the
1. "Insider trading," or trading while in possession of material nonpublic information, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1) (1991), was frequently the subject of headlines in the 1980s with scandals
such as those involving Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky affecting many of Wall Street's most
prestigious brokerage houses. H. REP. No. 100-910, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6051-52. It was perceived that "[i]nsider trading damages the legitimacy of the capital markets and
diminishes the public's faith... [and makes] the small investor... reluctant to invest in the market
if he feels it is rigged against him." Id. at 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6045. Legislation such
as the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,102 Stat.
4680, (1988) was an outgrowth of such insider trading scandals.
2. Inadequate oversight, regulation and supervision of the nation's savings and loans, as well
as outright fraud and insider abuse caused in part by poor auditing and reporting procedures, were
among the factors cited for the near-collapse of the nation's savings and loan system. H. REP. No.
101-54(), at 294 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 90. It has been estimated that the S & L
crisis will cost taxpayers about $500 billion; see, e.g., 138 CoNG. REc. H8422 (Sept. 15, 1992)
(printing the statement of Rep. Dingell). Among the major legislative remedies for the savings and
loan crisis was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
3. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 508.32 points, or
approximately 23 percent of its value-the largest single drop in history. The Crash of '87-Stocks
Plunge 508.32 Amid Panicky Selling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 5. The total investment
losses on that day approximated $1 trillion. Kenneth M. Lehn, Comment on the Harris Paper, 74
CoRNE.L L. Rev. 948, 949 (1989); Note, Margin Requirements: The Stock Market Crash of1987,
20 RUrroens LJ. 693, 693 n.1 (1989). A series of -circuit breakers" and other reforms were enacted
as a result of the 1987 crash. Safeguards Aim to Avert Another Crash, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992,
at C1, col. 5.
4. "Penny stocks" are low-priced, highly speculative securities generally sold in over-the-
counter markets and not listed on exchanges, and they are considered to be prime vehicles for
defrauding investors. H. REP. No. 101-617, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,1408.
Former SEC Chairman David Ruder called penny stock fraud 'one of the most menacing problems
facing investors, regulators, and the legitimate securities industry," id. at 8, reprinted in (1990) U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 14. The North American Securities Administrators Association agrees,
and has estimated that individual investors lose at least $2 billion each year as a result of penny stock
manipulations. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14. The fraud and abuse in the penny
stock markets led to the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931
(1990).
5. "Junk bonds" are higher-risk debt securities that are not rated by any major rating agency.
Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate Finance: The Treatment of Junk Bonds in Bankruptcy,
69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137, 1141-42 (1991). The principal losses to investors from junk bonds in 1990
alone was estimated at $5 billion, and the default rate of junk bonds that year was estimated at 38
percent. Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Takeovers and the Nancy Reagan Defense,
15 D L. J. CoRp. L 377, 456 n.400 (1990). Junk bonds are often blamed in part for the savings and
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most important issues in securities law today: The statute of
limitations.
The determination of the proper statute of limitations in actions
under the general antifraud provision of the federal securities laws,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 may not have
the appeal of insider trading, and may seem arcane and technical to
most. But this issue has the potential to affect billions of dollars in
pending securities claims.7 As the issue has been cast, it also touches
on many issues that affect core principles of our system of
government: The relationships between coequal branches of
government,8 equal treatment of similarly situated individuals,
9
government interference with legitimate expectations and vested
rights,10 and the implementation of judicial decisions and legislative
edicts.I1 In contrast, few would credit even Michael Milken with the
ability to have such a dramatic impact on the world.
Three recent events have combined to raise the statute of
limitations in section 10(b) actions, to prominence. First, in Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,12 the United States
Supreme Court created a new statute of limitations for section 10(b)
actions. The Court further indicated that the new statute of limitations
would be applied retroactively to all pending cases, thus potentially
extinguishing thousands of pending cases that had been timely up to
the date of the Lampf decision. 3 Second, Congress passed
legislation to undo the retroactive nature of the Supreme Court's
decision. 4 Finally, some lower federal courts have held that
loan crisis, and may also have had a strongly harmful impact on other financial industries. Junk Bond
Investments Blamed for Solvency Crisis, 1 LLB. & INS. BULL. (BNA), No. 21, at 5 (Dec. 22, 1986).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1992).
7. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (stating that Congress estimates that $6 billion
in claims would be effected by the application of the Lampj).
8. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 157-58, 350-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text
11. See infira notes 295-332 and accompanying text.
12. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (June 20, 1991).
13. Id. at 2782-83.
14. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
320
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Congress's action should itself be undone due to unconsti-
tutionality.15 Because of the practical importance of the issues
involved, as well as the constitutional questions presented, it is
entirely possible that Lampf s retroactivity will eventually be
addressed by the Supreme Court.16
Prior to the Congressional legislation, the lower federal courts
had applied Lampfretroactively to bar claims that were timely when
filed."7 Congress recognized that Lampf would be applied
retroactively, and it realized that this application would cause unfair
and unjust results.18 Indeed, Congress feared that thousands of
pending actions with over $6 billion in claimed damages would
suddenly be extinguished. 9
These fears provided a rational reason for Congress to "overrule"
the Supreme Court by nullifying the retroactive application of the
Lampf decision. This Article will contend that Congress was
constitutionally empowered to do so, because it is supreme in the area
of legislation, and it can correct a mistake of the Court in interpreting
its will.2" The Court's retroactively applied Lampf decision was
precisely this type of mistake, since it is contrary to congressional
policy to legislate a new statute of limitations and apply it
retroactively to bar existing claims which were timely when filed.2'
If the Supreme Court is called upon to determine the retroactivity
of Lampf, it need not reach the issue of whether Congress action was
constitutional. When courts act as legislatures, they should abide
generally by the rules that apply to legislatures. Since legislatures
enact laws on a prospective basis as a means of promoting justice,
fairness and stability,2 2 courts should consider themselves
15. As of this writing, the constitutional issue has been addressed by a number of district
courts and two federal appellate courts; see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
16. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has remanded one case that applied Lampf
retroactively, for further consideration in light of the Congressional legislation. Dennler v. Trippet,
112 S. CL 1757 (Apr. 27, 1992), granting cert. to Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 939 F.2d
1420 (10th Cir. 1991), as amended, 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991).
17. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 415-19 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
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empowered to do the same. A legislatively oriented approach would
lead to the conclusion that, even apart from Congress's legislation,
the Lampf decision should not be applied retroactively.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nonstatutory Federal Limitations Periods Before Lampf
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a
general prohibition of fraud or deception in the purchase or sale of
securities.'a The section does not contain an explicit right of private
claimants to bring civil actions.24 Since 1946, however, federal
courts have uniformly implied a private right of action under section
10(b).25 The Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of
23. The same is true of SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Exchange Act section 10(b), 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. That rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Most actions that are brought under Exchange Act § 10(b) also include allegations of violations
of Rule l0b-5, and most court decisions that deal with § 10(b) consider it together with Rule l0b-5
as part of the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969). The Lampfactions were also brought under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Reference will be made in this Article to § 10(b) only, both for simplicity and because it is the statute
actually passed by Congress.
24. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1992), in pertinent part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange... [to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1992).
25. The irst such case was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
For a brief history of the evolution of the remedy, see, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 380 n.10 (1983).
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such an action in 1971,26 and wrote in 1983 that the existence of an
implied cause of action was "beyond peradventure."27
In situations where Congress has not specified a statute of
limitations, the Court has "borrowed" the analogous limitations law
of the forum state. The practice is almost as old as the American
judicial system and was originally derived from the command of the
Rules of Decision Act that "[t]he laws of the several states, except
where [federal laws] otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they shall apply."28 Thus, the Supreme Court has
generally assumed that when Congress does not specify a statute of
limitations in a federal cause of action, it intends for the federal
courts to borrow the most closely analogous state limitations
period.
29
Congress could not provide for a statute of limitations in a section
10(b) private action, because it did not provide for a private action
under section 10(b).3" Thus, the normal state-borrowing rule would
26. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
27. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (holding that implied action under § 10(b) is "well
established"); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,230-31 (1988) (stating that implied action under
§ 10(b) is "an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements").
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1992). Originally, the Court did so because it believed the Rules of
Decision Act required it. Some of the earlier cases in the area include Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S.
647, 652 (1893); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 537 (1867); Leffmgwell v. Warren, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1862); Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 522,527 (1850); and
McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277 (1830).
Apparently, the Court now believes that, after Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
the state-borrowing rule is a general guide to what the Court should do, but in the end is no more
than a "fallback rule of thumb." DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158
n.12 (1983); id. at 174 n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Not all Justices of the Court subscribe to this
view. See Lampf et. al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2784 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that federal judges 'borrowed' state statutes of limitations because this was required by the Rules of
Decision Act); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 164-65 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that if Congress did not include a statute of limitations in its
legislation, it intended that there be no limitations period). This debate is unnecessary to, and beyond
the scope of, this Article.
29. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-59; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703
(1966); Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 163-65 (Scalia, J., concurring); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461,
463-64 (1947); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,397 (1906); McDonald
v. Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 72 (1902); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1895).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1992).
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suggest that in an implied action under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, the federal courts should borrow the statute of limitations of the
most analogous state action." In fact, until 1989, each federal court
faced with the question of the appropriate statute of limitations in a
private action under section 10(b) did apply the limitations law that
the forum state would have applied.32 In 1976, the Supreme Court
itself noted the appropriateness of the use of state limitations law in
section 10(b) actions.33
There was, however, some confusion as to which statute would
be most appropriate. In the earlier days of implied actions under
section 10(b), courts borrowed the state-law limitations period for
common-law fraud.34 Some courts continued to do so until they
gave up the practice of state-law borrowing after Data Access and
Lampf.35 Eventually, most courts adopted the limitations period for
civil actions under state blue sky laws.
3 6
The first significant deviation from the general federal court rule
of state borrowing of limitations periods came in the 1983 case of
31. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
32. Among the earliest cases in the area are Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627,634-35 (9th Cir.
1953); Fischuman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1951); and Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
33. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,210 n.29. The court stated: "[S]ince no statute
of limitations is provided for civil actions under § 10(b), the law of limitations of the forum state is
followed as in other cases of judicially implied remedies." Id. This statement was contained in an
analysis of the differences between explicit, Congressionally created rights of action under the
securities laws and the judicially implied § 10(b) right of action. The Court used its analysis to justify
imposing a scienter requirement in actions implied under § 10(b) that was not contained in the
statutorily created securities actions, in part because of the substantial difference between actions
under § 10(b) and those under statutorily created actions-the precise opposite of the Court's analysis
in Lampf. To like effect is Herman & Macecan v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,383-84 & n.18 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103-04 (loth Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993,996-97 (7th Cir.
1969); FiSCHMM, 188 F.2d at 787.
35. See, e.g., Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727,733 (9th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. McAlpin,
699 F.2d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (New York law); cf. Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960,
965-66 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that appropriate limitations period was either that for state blue-sky
claim or common-law fraud, depending on nature of plaintiff's action, an approach now foreclosed
by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)).
36. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman &Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500,1507
(11th Cir. 1986); Hermv. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669,677-78 (6thCir. 1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005, 1023 n.31 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977) rehearing denied, 554 F.2d 1065
(1977); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 7 There, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that federal courts should
borrow the limitations period of another federal law.3"
In DelCostello, union members had followed the terms of their
collective bargaining agreement and pursued grievances against their
employers through their unions. 9 When that process resulted in
unsatisfactory awards, the employees brought actions against the
employers for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and
against the unions for breach of the duty of fair representation, and
moved to vacate the awards.' The Court had previously held that
as between a ninety-day state limitations period for vacating arbitral
awards and a six-year period for breach of contract, the former was
a more appropriate choice in an action for breach of duty of fair
representation.41 In this case, however, the Court was concerned that
a ninety-day period, the prevailing period in most states, was too
short to give employees a realistic opportunity to pursue actions
against the unions that were ostensibly representing them.42
In light of that concern, the Court held that "state statutes of
limitation [would] be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of
federal law," and that Congress would not wish to choose a state
period "at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive
law."43 Since a limitations period of six months existed in a federal
action under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
44
and since the six-month limitations period was designed to
accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake in
DelCostello, the Court borrowed the six-month period and applied it
to a breach of duty action against the union.45 The Court also held
37. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
38. Id. at 154-55.
39. Id. at 155-57.
40. Id.
41. United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981).
42. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 & nn. 15-16, 167-68.
43. IX at 161.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
45. DelCostelo, 462 U.S. at 169-71.
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that the same limitations period should be applied to the unfair labor
practice action against the employer.'
The DelCostello Court cautioned that the practice of borrowing
state limitations periods, the action that would normally reflect
perceived Congressional intent, would remain the norm, even where
state law failed to provide a perfect analogy to the federal statute.47
It thus fashioned a narrow two-part test to determine whether an
exception to the usual state-borrowing rule would apply: A
limitations period may be borrowed from a different federal statute
only when (1) a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provided
a closer analogy than available state statutes and (2) when "the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."48
An analysis of DelCostello shows that the "practicalities of
litigation" criterion to which it referred was based on whether using
the state limitations period would place an undue burden on a party
seeking to invoke federal rights. In DelCostello, the Court was
concerned that a ninety day period was tot short for most employees
to make the decision to sue their own union, hire an attorney,
investigate the case and file the action.49 In order to determine
whether the practicalities of litigation required modification or
abandonment of a state limitations period, the cases on which
DelCostello relied similarly evaluated whether application of the
state limitations period would unduly burden a party's invocation of
a right under federal law."° In contrast, although a uniform national
46. Id. at 155.
47. Id at 171; accord Reed v. United Trans. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
48. DeICostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72.
49. Id at 165-68.
50. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (state limitations period
too great a burden on a government agency bringing a discrimination action); McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224-26 (1958) (application of shorter state limitations period for
unseaworthiness claim than for Jones Act claim brought in same action would diminish efficacy of
Jones Act claim); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946) (federal tolling doctrines
used to prevent possible inequity from mechanical application of state limitations period). Cases
subsequent to DelCostelo follow the same approach. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988)
(refusing to adopt state notice-of-claim statutes in federal civil rights action because of burden placed
on civil rights plaintiffs); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1984) (refusing to adopt state
administrative limitations period in federal civil rights action because of the substantial differences
between the "practicalities" of litigating a federal civil rights claim and those of invoking state
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limitations period was a factor underlying the DelCostello decision,
it was only relevant because of the "practicalities" involved in the
DelCostello action. The Court stated that uniformity was less
important in situations that do not embody a significant federal policy
such as the settlement of disputes under a collective bargaining
agreement." In the context of DelCostello, a uniform federal statute
would ensure that too-short state limitations periods, in light of the
practicalities of litigation, could not defeat the strong policies
underlying the federal labor laws. 2
Four years later, the Court generally followed the DelCostello
approach in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc.53 There, the Court declined to borrow state statutes of
limitations for actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 4 and instead borrowed the four-year
antitrust limitations period in the Clayton Act." The Court
recognized again that absent an explicit federal statute of limitations,
Congress "intends by its silence that we borrow state law," and that
federal borrowing was still the exception and not the rule. 6
Nonetheless, the Court held that it would borrow the limitations
period from another federal law because there was no satisfactory
state-law analogy to a RICO action. In the Court's view, the
multiplicity of possible predicate acts under RICO defied analogy to
a particular state limitations period, and "[c]oncepts such as RICO
'enterprise' and 'pattern of racketeering activity' were simply
unknown to the common law."5" The Court determined that,
administrative procedures); cf. Reed, 488 U.S. at 327 (holding that DelCostello exception to state-
borrowing rule did not apply because "[the] state personal injury statutes are of sufficient length to
accommodate the practical difficulties faced by [Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act]
§ 101 plaintiffs" that "no practicalities of litigation compel us to search beyond state law for a more
analogous statute of limitations").
51. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162-63 (citing Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 702 (1966)).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53. 483 U.S. 143 (1986).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1992).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1992).
56. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1986).
57. Id. at 152.
58. Id. at 149-50.
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although RICO had no state-law analogue, it was extremely similar
to the Clayton Act in the federal antitrust laws.59 In fact, RICO was
modeled on the Clayton Act,' and the legislative history of RICO
demonstrates that it was considered to be "the antitrust remedy being
adapted for use against organized criminality."61
Finally, the Malley-Duff Court found that the practicalities of
RICO litigation warranted federal borrowing under DelCostello.62
The generally multistate nature of a pattern of racketeering activity
"virtually guarantee[s] complex and expensive litigation over what
should be a straightforward matter." 63 In addition, adopting a
uniform four-year statute avoided the possibility of a too-short state
limitations period being applicable.64 Malley-Duff s "practicalities"
analysis generally followed the DelCostello approach in evaluating
whether state-law borrowing would place an undue burden on a party
involdng a federal right, although the opinion suggested a small shift
away from the burden analysis and toward a simple determination of
whether uniformity was desirable.'
In 1989, the Third Circuit became the first federal court to adopt
a uniform limitations period that was borrowed from another federal
statute in Exchange Act section 10(b) cases.' In In re Data Access
Systems Securities Litigation,67 the Third Circuit held that the
appropriate uniform limitations period was the one contained in
section 9(e) of the Exchange Act.68 This section required that
59. Id. at 151-52.
60. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
61. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 152 (quoting 116 CONO. REc. 35295 (1970)).
62. Id. at 153.
63. Id. at 154 (quoting Report of the Ad Hoe Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985)).
64. Id. at 154.
65. Much of the brief practicalities" analysis actually focuses on why uniformity is desirable.
Id. at 153-54.
66. The same result had first been suggested in Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329,1332 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
67. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). The author
of the Third Circuit's opinion had previously espoused this view in a Ninth Circuit case in which he
sat by designation. Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert,
J., concurring). Portions of the Davis concurrence are virtually identical to the Third Circuit's opinion
in Data Access.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1992).
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actions be brought no more than one year from the time when the
violation was discovered, and no more than three years from the time
of the violation.'
Although the Third Circuit cited DelCostello in its opinion, its
holding appears to have been based on a perception that Malley-Duff.
established a new "far closer analogy" test, using only the first part
of the two-part DelCostello approach and deleting the "practicalities"
criterion.70 The Third Circuit held that a federal court should borrow
a limitations period from another federal statute whenever the federal
statute "bears a far closer analogy.., than any state alternative. "
The Court reasoned that the remainder of the federal securities laws
bore a close analogy to section 10(b) because all of the federal
securities laws reflected the same general purpose: To "provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent fraud in the
sale thereof." 72 In addition, the court decided that a uniform
limitations period was desirable, because "you simply should not
have a different Securities Act [sic] limitations period for Rome, New
York and Athens, Georgia." 3 The above factors led the court to
borrow what it perceived to be the federal law closest to Exchange
Act section 10(b), rather than New Jersey state law.74
Despite DelCostello's admonition that courts pay close attention
to the practicalities of litigation in determining whether to borrow a
federal statute, Data Access contained no substantive analysis of this
issue.75 Nor did the decision contain any analysis of the particular
69. The language in § 9(e) is slightly different from that of other limitations periods in the
securities laws. For example, § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, provides for a
limitations period of one year from the time the violation was or should have been discovered, and
no more than three years from the time of the violation. Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the
Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 607, 620. Courts have already erred by using the more
common § 13 period instead of the § 9(e) period. Id. at 623 & n.55.
70. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 1548.
72. Id. at 1547 (quoting Blue hip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S 723,728 (1975)).
73. Id. at 1549.
74. Id. at 1549-50.
75. The phrase "practicalities of litigation" appears in Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542, 1545,
1548, and 1549. There is no analysis at any of these points or at any other point as to why the
.practicalities of litigation" counseled against a state-borrowing approach. Nor is there any analysis
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circumstances that led the DelCostello Court to borrow a limitations
period from another federal statute rather than from state law.76
The Third Circuit did not address the retroactivity of the new
limitations period in Data Access, but held in later cases that the new
limitations period could be applied retroactively to bar claims that
were pending at the time of the Data Access decision." The
dissenters in Data Access did address the retroactivity question, and
they objected to the inequity of applying a newly created statute of
limitations retroactively to bar claims that had been timely when
filed, because a plaintiff cannot have slept on his rights when he
could not have known he had any rights.78 The Supreme Court did
not immediately follow the Third Circuit's acceptance of retroactivity
for new and shorter limitations periods; instead, it utilized an
approach similar to that of the Data Access dissenters when it held
that a newly adopted, shortened limitations period in an action under
42 U.S.C. section 1981 would not be applied retroactively.79
The federal courts of appeal divided on whether to adopt Data
Access. The Second and Seventh Circuits followed the lead of the
of what the phrase "practicalities of litigation" means or signifies.
76. DelCostello was mentioned in Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1540, 1542, 1543, 1545, 1548,
1549, and 1550. At each point, however, it was only mentioned in passing or in summary. There was
no discussion of the case itself.
77. Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008-09
(1989); Gatto v. Meridian Medical Assocs., Inc., 882 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1989) (action under Exchange
Act § 29(b)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080 (1990).
78. The dissenters explained:
[RIetroactive application of the statute of limitations rule [would deprive] the plaintiff of
.any remedy whatsoever on the basis of superseding legal doctrine that was quite
unforeseeable ... 'It would produce the most 'substantial inequitable results' ... to hold
that [plaintiff] 'slept on his rights' at a time when he could not have known the time
limitation that the law imposed upon him . . . [Nonretroactive application simply
preserves his right to a day in court.'
Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1553 (Seitz, ., dissenting) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 108 (1971)).
79. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608 (1987).
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Third Circuit.80 The Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, however,
declined to follow Data Access.81
B. The Lampf Decision
Lanpfbegan as a set of cases that were brought in the District of
Oregon between late 1986 and mid-1987, in which the plaintiffs
alleged fraud in the sale of various limited partnership interests. 2
The District Court granted summary judgment for all of the
defendants on limitations grounds. 3 However, it did so by applying
the two-year limitations period applicable to fraud claims in the state
of Oregon. 4 On February 5, 1990, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the plaintiffs could invoke federal tolling principles to
avoid the two-year bar." The petition for certiorari was filed on
August 10, 1990 and granted on October 9, 1990.86
In a 5-2-2 decision announced on June 20, 1991, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision. Like the Third Circuit
in Data Access, the Supreme Court adopted the one year/three year
limitations period of Exchange Act section 9(e) for implied actions
under Exchange Act section 10(b).8' A plurality of the Lampf Court
recognized the rule that, absent an explicit federal statute of
limitations, "Congress ordinarily 'intends by its silence that we
80. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 361 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville Shoe
Mfg. Co., 908 P.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2887 (June 28, 1991).
81. Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817,819 (10th Cir. 1990); Smith v.
Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569 (lth Cir. 1990); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384
(9th Cir. 1990).
82. Lampf et. al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2776; Reitz v. Leasing Consultants
Associates, 895 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, at 3), rev'd
sub nom Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, I11 S. Ct. 2773 (June 20, 1991).
83. Reitz, text in WESTLAW, at 4.
84. Lampf, I11 S. Ct. at 2777.
85. Reitz, text in WESTLAW, at 4.
86. Petition for cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3168 (Aug. 10, 1990); cert. granted, 111 S. CL 242
(Oct. 9, 1990).
87. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2783.
88. Id at 2778.
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borrow state law.'" 9 Nonetheless, the Court decided that "where the
claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an
express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should
look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations
period."'* The Court further held that the three-year repose period
could not be tolled, and that as a result, the claims of the Lampf
plaintiffs were untimely.9
The four dissenting Justices had two different views of the correct
approach. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, objected to
the Court's adoption of a short and untollable three-year outside time
limit for fraud claims. 92 He believed that a limitations period of one
year from the time the cause of action was discovered, with no
outside time limit (repose period), was a far better balance of
competing interests.93 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter,
thought that the Court's action was unwarranted judicial legislation,
and that the Rules of Decision Act94 required the Court to adopt the
analogous state-law limitations period.9"
89. ld. at 2778 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)). Justice Scalia joined the majority's determination to apply § 9(e), but
disagreed with its methodology for determination the appropriate limitations period. l. at 2783
(Scalia, ., concurring).
90. 1, at 2780 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 2782 (plurality opinion).
92. M, at 2788-90 (Kennedy, L, dissenting).
93. Id. Justice Kennedy believed that a court should give careful consideration to the policies
underlying a federal statute and the practical difficulties an aggrieved person may have in establishing
a violation. Id. at 2788. This follows DelCostello's approach of determining whether the
"practicalities of litigation" place an undue burden on a party seeking to invoke federal rights; see
supra note 49 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy then correctiy noted that the one/three year
limitations periods in the federal securities laws "relate to express causes of action which in their
purpose and underlying rationale differ from the cause of action implied under § 10(b)." Lampf, I ll
S. CL at 2789 (Kennedy, L, dissenting). Justice Kennedy also noted that there are significant burdens
on plaintiffs seeking to prove § 10(b) claims, the greatest of which may be discovery of the fraud
in the first place. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He concluded that because of the inherent
concealment of many frauds, a three-year repose period "makes a § 10(b) action all but a dead letter
for injured investors who by no conceivable standard of fairness or practicality can be expected to
file suit within three years after the violation occurred." Id. Instead, he argued that a one-year-from-
discovery rule, with the possible application of equitable principles such as laches for truly stale
claims, "is sufficient to ensure a fair balance between protecting the legitimate interests of aggrieved
investors, yet preventing stale claims." Id.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1992).
95. Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
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The Lampf decision, like Data Access, purported to follow the
two-part DelCostello approach.96 Like Data Access, however, it
generally ignored the factor that was so important in DelCostello and
subsequent cases: Whether the practicalities of litigation warranted
rejection of the customary state-law borrowing rule.' As discussed
above, much of the reason the Court declined to borrow a state
limitations period in DelCostello centered around the practical
burdens faced by employees who want to invoke federal rights by
bringing actions against their unions.98 The DelCostello Court
considered it important to the policies underlying the federal labor
laws to provide employees sufficient time in which to file actions
against their unions."
Had the Lampf Court followed the DelCostello "practicalities"
analysis, it should have concluded that application of a three-year
repose period with no possible tolling would have been too great a
burden to place on possible plaintiffs, because such a limitation might
bar fraud actions before the victim could even find out about the
fraud.1"0 However, no such consideration of the burdens faced by
securities plaintiffs when invoking federal rights can be found in the
Lampf decision. 1 ' Instead of examining the practical burdens
96. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
97. That factor was mentioned in 111 S. CL at 2778. but was not discussed there.
98. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
100. Because victims of fraud might not even find out about the fraud until after the expiration
of the three-year repose period, the Securities and Exchange Commission viewed this period as too
short to effectuate the purposes of the federal securities laws. 'An unrealistically short limitations
period would in many such cases effectively immunize the perpetrators of deliberately fraudulent
schemes from liability to private investors." Testimony of SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, quoted
in 137 CONo. REc. S18624 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan); see Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2781
(discussing the SEC's contention that the three-year repose period frustrates policies underlying §
10(b)). Such deprivations of claims have already occurred as a result of retroactive application of the
new § 10(b) period; see, e.g., (atto v. Meridian Medical Assocs., 882 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir. 1989).
A Lampfdissenter observed that the plaintiffs in a prominent § 10(b) case only found out about
their cause of action from a broker's suicide note-25 years after the fact. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2789
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189 (1976)).
101. It has been argued that the Court erred in its holding that the three-year repose period
cannot be tolled. Johnson, supra note 69, at 629, 677. Had the Court adopted Professor Johnson's
interpretation of the one/three year limitations period, plaintiffs might not be substantially burdened
by the new limitations period. Professor Johnson argues that plaintiffs may in fact be better off; the
one-year limitations period runs from the time of the discovery of the wrong and not from the time
of the wrong itself, and should be tolled by fraudulent concealment. Id. at 624-26, 628-30. The
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placed on plaintiffs, the Lampf Court simply held that because there
is an interstate component to federal securities law violations, there
should be a uniform statute of limitations nationwide. This
conclusion does not follow from the Court's prior decisions. Since
federal statutes often owe their existence to some interstate
component, such an approach also significantly weakens the normal
state-borrowing rule, and the Court has in the past declined to do that
solely for the sake of uniformity.102 Moreover, recent Supreme
Court decisions have held that uniformity can be achieved by
borrowing a single class of state limitations periods for use in the
federal statutory action. 103 The Court could easily have adopted that
approach in Lampf. Had the Court actually applied DelCostello, it
would have reached this conclusion, because the strong analogy
between the two actions would have been viewed as taking
precedence over any perceived desire for uniformity.
An action for damages under section 10(b) has been described as
"nothing more than a modified form of common law deceit.""° It
could thus have been governed by the forum limitations period for
the analogous common-law fraud action.
Court's Lampf decision, however, rejected without much analysis the view that the one/three year
period can be equitably tolled. Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2782. Thus, as it stands, the holding unduly
burdens many plaintiffs who seek to invoke federal rights.
102. See Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-05 (1966).
103. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,276 (1985) (applying personal injury limitations period
of forum to action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it has its roots in tort and is closest to a personal
injury action); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (providing that, in § 1983 actions, general
personal injury limitations period governs over limitations period for specific intentional tort in states
with more than one personal injury limitations period). While civil rights cases fall under a
congressionally mandated state-borrowing rule, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that does not diminish the
significance of the uniformity analysis.
104. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J., concurring);
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLcan, 640 F.2d 534, 547 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); 3 Louis Loss, SE uRITIEs REoULATION 1772 (2d ed. 1961); see also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, 206 (1976) (noting that § 10(b) is designed to
prevent fraud and manipulative practices); Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that this undercuts any argument for using any of the limitations periods in the express
securities causes of action as the limitations period for a § 10(b) action). When Rule lob-5 was
brought to the Securities and Exchange Commission for a vote in 1942, the debate began and ended
with one Commissioner remarking, "Well, we are against fraud, 'aren't we?" Remarks of Milton
Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)
(quoted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
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Since it is important that a limitations period have some relation
to the statute it is limiting, this alternative is the logical choice based
on the strong similarity between a section 10(b) action and a
common-law fraud action.105 It is also most likely to have reflected
the actual intent of Congress.
Although Congress comprehensively studied and overhauled the
federal securities laws in 1975, it did not nullify or modify the
judicially implied section 10(b) cause of action. The Supreme Court
has indicated that failure to amend or nullify impliedly signals that
Congress ratified the section 10(b) action as it existed in 1975.'06
Since the state-borrowing doctrine was the unquestioned rule of
implied limitations periods in 1975, and had been the unquestioned
rule for 150 years, that doctrine can be said to reflect Congressional
intent most closely, either because Congress "ratified" the section
105. The earlier cases did so, and the Ninth Circuit continued to do so until the Supreme
Court's decision in Lampf, see infra note 151 and accompanying text Alternatively, the Court could
have picked the state-law blue sky limitations period, which most courts used before Data Access,
see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
There are minor differences between a section 10(b) action and a common-law fraud action,
differences that reflect the particular goals of the federal securities laws. For example, common-law
fraud does not limit standing to purchasers or sellers of securities, usually requires proof greater than
a preponderance of the evidence, and provides for an award of punitive damages. However, the
essence of the two actions is the same: intentional deceit, on which the victim relies, and as a result
of which the victim suffers damages. That is more than sufficient for state-law borrowing, as there
is no requirement that the federal statute and the state-law analogue be identical for state-law
borrowing to be appropriate; see, e.g., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)
(analogizing claim for union's violation of employee's free speech rights to state personal injury laws
for limitations purposes).
106. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 384-86 (holding that since a consistent line of
judicial decisions allowed actions to proceed simultaneously under Exchange Act § 10(b) and § 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, "Congress's decision to leave § 10(b) intact [. the comprehensive
1975 amendments, in light of this line of decisions] suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative
nature of the § 10(b) action"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
381-82 (1982) (holding that implied cause of action under Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) was
part of the "contemporary legal context" under which Congress effected sweeping revisions of CEA
in 1974; fact that Congress left implied action intact in this context is evidence Congress
affirmatively intended the remedy); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 n.4 (1977)
(Stevens, L, dissenting) (quoted in Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. at 391 n.92) (noting that
securities statutes originally enacted in 1933 and 1934 "have been amended so often with full
Congressional awareness of the judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as implicitly creating a private
remedy that we must now assume that Congress intended to create rights for the specific beneficiaries
of the legislation"); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to
be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
when it re-enacts a statute without change. ... ").
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10(b) cause of action as it existed in 1975 or because it "ratified"
application of the state-borrowing principles that were uniformly
applied to section 10(b) actions in 1975.1" The Court has used a
similar approach in the past, holding that "when Congress has
disagreed with such an interpretation of its silence, it [spoke] to
overturn it by enacting a uniform period of limitations."0 8 It is
much more likely that Congress did intend to ratify the entirety of a
section 10(b) action it knew to exist along with the limitations period
Congress knew that action contained, than that Congress intended to
adopt a limitations period which would bar many actions before the
victims could find out about the underlying violation of the law.
The limitations period that the Court did use is analytically
difficult to justify because the implied action under section 10(b) is
not at all like the explicit civil actions in the federal securities
laws.t"9 The Court has in fact stated that at least one of those
statutes "address[es] different types of wrongdoing than section
10(b),""' and has suggested that all such statutes are different and
should be treated differently from section 10(b)."' Of the six
107. Either would follow from the premise that Congress ratified the § 10(b) action as it existed
in 1975; see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing state borrowing doctrine).
108. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966).
109. Although the Court's analysis is flawed, many, if not most, commentators supported
adoption of the one/three year limitations periods of other federal securities laws for § 10(b) actions.
See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (1987); Kevin R.Jobnson, Bridging the Gap: Some
Thoughts About Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities Laws, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
879, 889 (1991). As one commentator wrote, "would it not be eminently more consistent with the
overall statutory scheme to look to what Congress itself did when it was thinking specifically of prior
actions in securities cases than to a grab-bag of more or less analogous state statutes?" Louis Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS Op SEcumEs REaULATlON 995 (2d ed. 1988).
While this analysis would make determination of the appropriate statute of limitations easier
than state-borrowing would, it overlooks the fact that given historical practice, congressional intent
is most likely to be followed by use of the state-borrowing process of which Congress was most
likely well aware. It also overlooks the fact that a statute of limitations should be based on a policy
determination that considers the nature of the underlying action, and that may not be well served by
adoption of a limitations period from an action that is different in nature and is directed at a different
type of wrong. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
110. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
111. Id. at 384 n.18; Ernst & Emst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-11 (1976). Thus, as
Justice Stevens noted, the Court did not find any congressional intent "to .pattern § 10 of the 1934
Securities Act (sic] after those sections subject to a 1- and 3-year limitation." Lampf v. Gilbertson,
111 S. CL 2773, 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy made a similar point in his Lampf
dissent Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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statutes in the federal securities laws which contain the one/three year
limitations period, five are part of civil actions that do not require the
plaintiff to prove scienter to establish civil liability." 2 Some of
these actions are based on strict liability,"3 and the rest allow a
defendant to escape liability only by meeting a burden of proving
"good faith""' 4 or "due diligence,"" 5 which would negate a
finding of scienter.16 Since the plaintiff does not face the difficult
task of proving the defendant's scienter, his action is correspondingly
that much easier," 7 and a short limitations or repose period may
well be appropriate. The same cannot be said about a section 10(b)
plaintiff, who does have the burden of proving the defendant's
seienter. 118
The one explicit federal securities action that requires proof of
scienter is Exchange Act section 9(e). 9 Section 9(e) is an
extremely specific statute that is directed toward "painting the
tape,"'120 "wash sales, ''121 and other activities designed to affect
112. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988); Exchange Act §§ 18 and 29, 15 U.S.C. §§
78r(c) and 78cc(b) (1991); Trust Indenture Act § 323(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1988); and Public
Utility Holding Company Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 79p(a) (1988).
113. Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988); Exchange Act § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc
(1991). Section I1 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), is a strict liability statute as to the
issuer only.
114. Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988); Exchange Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1988); Trust Indenture Act § 323, 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1988); Public Utility Holding Company Act
§ 16, 15 U.S.C. § 79p (1988). This is a defense that a party did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of an untruth or material omission. In re ltel Securities
Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 104, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
115. By its very terms, Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1988), admits to a "due
diligence" defense for parties other than the issuer. This defense is operative when such parties, after
reasonable investigation, had a reasonable belief that a registration statement was true and contained
no material omissions. See Hill York Corp. v. American nt'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,696 (5th
Cir. 1971) (applying- term to § 12(2) defense).
116. Id.
117. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 244 n.1 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (setting forth differences between the § 12(2)
express cause of action and the § 10(b) implied cause of action).
118. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1992).
120. This refers to the practice of engaging in a series of fictional transactions which appear
to the public on the "tape" (real-time record of securities transactions) and thus create a false
appearance of activity in the stock. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
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artificially the price of a stock traded on a national securities
exchange.122 Given the greater openness of the process of trading
securities on national exchanges, and given that a scheme to
manipulate the price of an exchange-traded stock is unlikely to keep
the price of the stock inflated for more than a few months (let alone
three years), a short repose period may make sense in this context as
well. In addition, greater considerations of repose might be desirable
for an allegation of fraud in the price of a security traded on a
national stock exchange. These factors obviously do not apply to a
general statute that applies broadly to any type of fraud touching on
the purchase or sale of any security,12 ' and in many cases is not
even susceptible to discovery within three years.
124
The Lampf Court's reason for rejecting the fraud limitations
period of the forum state was that "consideration of state-law
alternatives [is] unnecessary where Congress has provided an express
limitations period for correlative remedies within the same
enactment."' 25 In other words, one is'to look first to whether there
are other federal remedies in the same enactment before deciding
whether to borrow state law. This approach turns the normal state-
borrowing doctrine on its head. The Court apparently posited that
Congress would have intended to use other statutes of limitations
within the "same enactment when such statutes are available, but no
support was provided for such an assumption."1 26 A limitations
period should not be completely arbitrary, but should have some
121. "Wash' sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial ownership. " Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25 (1976).
122. Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cit. 1982), vacated on other
grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); 3 L. Loss, S cuRrriEs REoUL.AToN 1748-49 (2d ed. 1988).
123. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-12 (1971).
124. Accord Lampf et. al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
125. Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2782.
126. The Court's analysis went no further than to say, "we can imagine no clearer indication
of how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision
than the balance struck by Congress in limiting similar and related protections." Id at 2780.
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relation to the particular type of action that is being limited.127
Thus, courts would be better served by looking at the policies
underlying a given action to determine a limitations period, rather
than limiting their inquiry to whether another limitations period-no
matter how different its underlying statute is from the law in
question-existed in the same enactment. 2
Lampf was silent regarding whether other federal laws might
provide closer analogies to Exchange Act section 10(b) than laws in
the same enactment. 129 If the Court felt compelled to use a federal
limitations period, it could have borrowed the one from the statute
governing a private cause of action that actually is most analogous to
one under Exchange Act section 10(b)-the two-year limitations
period under Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) section 22.130
CEA section 22 provides a private right of action for violations
of any provision of the CEA, including the general antifraud
provision of CEA section 4b.' The Supreme Court has recognized
that the language of CEA section 4b is similar to that of Securities
127. A statute of limitations should be chosen with due regard for "the substantive policies
underlying the ... claim." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985). As one common example,
state tort actions usually have much shorter limitations periods than actions for breach of a written
contract, because the evidence that might be relevant to a tort action is not as easily preserved as the
written evidence of contract provisions. Schleif v. Hardware Dealer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 404
S.W.2d 490, 492-93 (Tenn. 1966).
128. Under the Court's apparent "same enactment" test, if the only express right of action in
the federal securities laws had been the short-swing profit action under § 16 of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988), the Court would have borrowed the limitations period of that statute, even
though there is absolutely no similarity between an action under § 16 and one under § 10(b). Or, if
Congress had happened to codify the § 10(b) action at the same time (1988) that it enacted a private
action for insider trading, Exchange Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1, the § 10(b) limitations period
would be the same as that for insider trading merely because of the time of enactment--even though
the Lampf Court rejected equating these two limitations period based on its perception of
Congressional intent. Lampf, I11 S. Ct. at 2781.
129. The Court held that "where, as here, the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that
also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should look frst to the
statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period.... When the statute of origin contains
comparable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at an end. Only where no
analogous counterpart is available should a court then proceed to apply state-borrowing principles."
A at 2780. There was no mention in the decision of borrowing a limitations period from any other
federal statute.
130. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1992).
131. Id § 6b.
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Exchange Act section 10(b).132 It has also stated that SEC Rule
10(b)(5) is "analogous" to CEA section 4b." By contrast, courts
which compare Exchange Act section 10(b) with explicit rights of
action in the securities laws usually speak of the differences, not the
similarities."3
Moreover, borrowing the CEA two-year period would serve the
salient purpose of equating the limitations periods for securities and
commodities claims under general antifraud provisions. Not only is
there a strong analogy between the actions under Securities Exchange
Act section 10(b) and CEA section 22, but Congress, the courts, and
commentators have found the securities and commodities fields in
general to be analogous.135 At least one court held that the statute
of limitations for the implied right of action under CEA section 4b
(the predecessor to the explicit action under section 22) should be the
same as that for a Exchange Act section 10(b) action, because of the
strong analogy between the two.1 36 Judicial adoption of the CEA
two-year limitations period for section 10(b) claims would also pass
the DelCostello "practicalities of litigation" test, because the running
of the two-year CEA limitations period can be tolled by fraudulent
132. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 389 n.88 (1982). Prior
to the enactment of CEA § 22 in 1982, courts had divided over whether a private right of action
could be implied from the general antifraud provisions of CEA § 4b. Section 22 was proposed at a
time when this had not been decided by the Supreme Court. H. Rep. No. 97-565 (Part 1) 56-57 (May
17,1982) (reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871,3905-06). Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided
in the Curran case that such an action could be implied, in part because of the analogies between
CEA § 4b and Securities Exchange Act § 10(b). Curran, 456 U.S. at 389 n.88, 394-95. Although the
enactment of § 22 came shortly after the Curran decision, the Conference Committee noted that the
parameters of the implied action were left vague by Curran. H. Rep. No. 97-565 (Part ED 53 (June
21, 1922) (reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4022,4071). Apparently for this reason, Congress went
ahead with the original proposal and superseded the implied action with the express one.
133. Curran, 456 U.S. at 394.
134. For example, the express private civil actions contain express recognitions of the standard
of liability, which the general language of § 10(b) lacks. The express civil remedies are subject to
significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b), such as bends for and awards of costs.
And most of the express civil actions have lacked the scienter requirement present in section 10(b);
see e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382-84 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-11 & n.30 (1976).
135. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 298 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom, Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
136. Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 852 F.2d 516, 519-20 (10th Cir. 1988).
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concealment or other acts that fall under customary federal tolling
doctrines.
137
Given the above mentioned reasons, it would make far more
sense to borrow the limitations period from the federal statute most
analogous to section 10(b) than one from statutes that merely happen
to be in the "same enactment." Since the issue was not presented to
the Lampf Court, the principle of stare decisis do not prevent the
Supreme Court from superseding Lampf and holding that the
limitations period of CEA section 22 is more appropriate for an
Exchange Act section 10(b) action than is the limitations period of
Exchange Act section 9(e).
138
Finally, Justice Kennedy's innovative approach of borrowing part
of the section 9(e) limitations period-one year from when the fraud
was discovered-but not borrowing the three-year repose period also
deserves mention.139 The Lampf majority was correct in stating that
there is no rule or practice which countenances this approach. 140
However, if the Supreme Court has the power to create a statute of
limitations where none previously existed, it must certainly have the
power to determine the method by which it will create that new
statute of limitations. There was, after all, no Supreme Court
precedent or rule at the time of the 1983 DelCostello decision that
supported borrowing a limitations period from another federal
137. There are no reported cases yet that discuss the tolling of the limitations period in CEA
§ 22. However, the limitations provisions of § 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1988), are
identical in substance to those of CEA § 22. Federal appellate courts have unanimously agreed that
the four-year limitations period in Clayton Act § 4B can be tolled under the federal tolling doctrine
of Holmberg v. Armbrecht. See, e.g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558-59
& n.29 (1974); Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, 658 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.
1981); In re Beef Indust. Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
905 (1980); Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Atlantic City Ele. Co. v. General Ele. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963).
138. Compare United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (state-law period for
vacating arbitral award would prevail over state-law breach of contract period in action for unfair
labor practices; no consideration of borrowing another federal statute because that possibility not
presented to Court) with DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
(superseding Mitchell and borrowing federal limitations period in analogous statute in action for
unfair labor practices).
139. Lampfv. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2788 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2782 n.8.
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statute. 4 1 The Supreme Court, however, did exactly that in
DelCostello because it did not think Congress would have meant to
have a limitations period that interfered with the proper functioning
of a federal program.'42
Given that the federal securities laws are to be flexibly construed
to effectuate the remedial purposes of Congress, 141 there is nothing
to support the Court's conclusion that Congress would consider
policies of repose more important than the protection of investors
who are prevented from finding out about fraud within three years.
In other contexts, the Court has held that policies of repose are
outweighed when the interests of justice require giving plaintiffs the
opportunity to vindicate their rights.
44
Deciding on the appropriate statute of limitations is in the end a
policy choice.145 If the Supreme Court is going to weigh policy
considerations in order to create a new statute of limitations, there is
no reason that it cannot decide to "borrow" half of another federal
limitations period rather than a whole one based on that weighing. If
it does not consider itself empowered to borrow half of a statute, one
must ask whence it derives the power to borrow a whole statute.
Neither, after all, embodies "judicial legislation" any more than the
other. Neither is based on anything Congress has put into section
10(b) itself, and there does not seem to be any principled distinction
between the two.146
In short, the Lampf declsion marks a significant departure from
the previously used doctrine of application of a state limitations
period except in rare circumstances. 47 The Court has instead
moved toward a doctrine that a federal court should look to other
limitations periods in the same enactment whenever there is some
interstate component to an action.
141. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
142. Id. at 161-62..
143. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983).
144. See, e.g., Bumett v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
145. See infra notes 342 and accompanying text.
146. An approach similar to Justice Kennedy's can be found in Johnson, supra note 109, at
913, 934.
147. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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Judicial legislation of limitations periods based on the "same
enactment" test, however, may not always be appropriate, since the
courts are no longer trying to find the best "fit" between the action in
question and the limitations period being borrowed. Instead, the
"same enactment" approach sharply increases the possibility that a
statute of limitations will not be a well-considered balance of policy
considerations, and will be a mechanical application of inapposite
statutes rather than a reasoned determination of what particular
period Congress is most likely to have wanted had it thought about
the matter.
C. The Retroactivity of the New Limitations Period
The Lampf Court did not hold that the new limitations period
would be applied retroactively to extinguish pending cases (other
than those of the Lampf plaintiffs), and did not even discuss the
question of retroactivity. Instead, it simply ordered the complaints in
the Lampf actions dismissed for untimeliness.14
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented. Justice
O'Connor objected to the majority's decision to order the dismissal
of the plaintiffs' claims under the new limitations period.149 Until
that time, the Court had never applied a new limitations period
retroactively to the very case in which it was announcing the new
rule, so as to bar the action of the plaintiffs. 150 Justice O'Connor
noted that when the actions were filed in 1986, there was a "solid
wall of Ninth Circuit authority dating back more than 30 years"
mandating that the state statute of limitations be borrowed in an
148. The Court ruled:
As there is no dispute that the earliest of plaintiff-respondents' complaints was filed more
than three years after petitioner's alleged misrepresentations, plaintiff-respondents' claims
were untimely.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2782-83 (1991).
149. 1& at 2785-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. a at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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action under Exchange Act section 10(b). 151 In fact, every
jurisdiction at the time the Lampf actions were filed borrowed the
analogous state statute of limitations, as the actions were filed
approximately three years before Data Access was decided. Justice
O'Connor believed that the plaintiffs' reliance on the state-law
limitations period was "entirely proper," and that Lampf "shutol the
courthouse door on respondents because they were unable to predict
the future." 152 She would have continued to use the approach to
civil retroactivity set forth in the Court's 1971 decision in Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson,153 and would not have applied the new limitations
period to the Lampfplaintiffs.
The Lampf plaintiffs were not the only ones who faced sudden
and unexpected deprivation of their cause of action. Rather, a
decision issued by the Court on the same day, James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,54 suggested strongly that the Lampf rule
would be applied retroactively to bar all section 10(b) claims that
were timely when filed but did not fit within the new limitations
period of Lampf
In the Beam opinion, the Court applied retroactively an earlier
decision, Bacchus Imports, Ltd v. Dias,1 55 that invalidated a state
excise tax as violative of the Commerce Clause.'56 Justice Souter,
with the concurrence of Justices Stevens and White, limited his
analysis to the narrow choice of law issue of whether a new rule
pronounced in a case before a federal court must be applied
retroactively to other litigants if it is applied to the parties before the
court.15' He believed that retroactive application under these
circumstances was required, and that federal courts were not
empowered to apply decisions with "selective prospectivity"-in other
151. Id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Perhaps it is for such reasons that the Supreme
Court is usually much more reluctant than it was in Lampf to set aside decades of uniform lower
court interpretations of a law. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 174 (1931).
152. Lampf, 111 S. CL at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
154. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (June 20, 1991). Lampfwas not mentioned in the Beam decision.
155. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
156. Id. at 273.
157. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.); id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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words, applying a new rule of law to the litigants before the Court but
not to other litigants whose cases were pending at the same time.158
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, would
have gone farther and held that the Constitution requires all Supreme
Court pronouncements to be applied retroactively.159 Thus, based
on the opinions of Justice Souter and Justice Scalia, six of nine
Justices agreed that when a new decision is applied to the litigants in
that case, the decision should be applied retroactively to all litigants
everywhere, except those who are barred by procedural requirements
or res judicata. Justice O'Connor, joined in dissent by Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, would have continued to use
the Court's prior approach in civil retroactivity cases that had been
set forth in the 1971 case of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.16" Chevron
Oil held that a federal court should not apply a new decision
retroactively if it represents a "clear break" with past precedent, and
if doing so would create an unduly harsh result.16
Since six of nine Supreme Court Justices held that a new court
decision must be applied to all litigants if it is applied to one, and
since the Court's new section 10(b) limitations period was applied to
the Lampf plaintiffs, the natural conclusion would be that the new
section 10(b) limitations period must be applied to everyone, even
parties whose claims were timely under the former limitations period.
The lower federal courts certainly drew this conclusion. All lower
courts that addressed the issue held that Beam required Lampfs
retroactive application, even if that would bar pending claims that
were timely when filed.
162
158. Id. at 2447-48 (opinion of Souter, J.).
159. Id. at 2450-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
161. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. The many such cases that so held prior to the enactment into law of § 27A include:
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. July 22, 1991), as amended, 947 F.2d
897 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1991), vacated and remanded sub noma. Denler v. Trippet, 112 S. Ct. 1757
(Apr. 27, 1992); Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 1991) (per
curiam); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1991); Baggett v. Edward D. Jones
& Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder] 96,215 (D. Kan. June 27, 1991); Barr
v. McGraw-Hill, 770 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. N.Y. July 16,1991); Duke v. Touche, Ross & Co., Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder] 96,121 (S.D. N.Y. July 24, 1991); Berent v. Kemper
Corp., 780 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1991); Haggerty v. Comstock Gold Co., 770 F. Supp.
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D. Congressional Response to Lampf
Congress also viewed Beam as requiring the retroactive
application of Lampf even if that would bar pending claims."6 3 This
concerned Congress, which recognized that securities claims with
tremendous value, estimated to be as much as $6.4 billion, might
have died on June 20, 1991.164 In particular, Congress appears to
have been concerned that actions against prominent people who were
linked to the savings and loan crisis, such as Michael Milken, Charles
Keating, and "other famous rogues-165 and "icons of greed,"16
would be subject to dismissal under the new Lampf rule.167 Its
solution was, in effect, to allow the Court's one and three-year
limitations period to stand, but to overrule the perceived retroactive
application of Lampf.68
216 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 21, 1991); Khindri v. Yogel, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (1991-92 Transfer
Binder] 96,545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1991); Joyner v. Triple Check Fin. Serv., 782 F.Supp. 364 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 5, 1991); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 774 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1991);
In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder] 196,542 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 11, 1991); Randolph County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sutliffe, 775 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 15, 1991); In re Meiridge Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder]
96,440 (D. Ore. Oct. 30, 1991), vacated, 1992 WL 58265 (D. Ore. March 20, 1992); Continental
Bank, Nat'l Assn v. Village of Ludlow, 777 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 1991); Hastie v.
American Agri-Corp., 774 F. Supp. 1251 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1991); Held v. Davis, 778 F.Supp. 527
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1991).
163. 137 CONG. REC. Hi1811 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (letterof Rep. Dingell).
164. Id. HI 1811 (letter of Rep. Dingell) ("According to a survey by our Telecommunications
and Finance Subcommittee, suits totaling $652 million have been thrown out as a result of the
Court's ruling. Motions to dismiss an additional $4.55 billion suits are pending, and motions to
dismiss a further $1.21 billion of suits are expected."). One of the actions that was dismissed as a
result of Lampf was a consolidated 1974 action alleging a giant Ponzi scheme, which had already
resulted in a $130 million jury verdict. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F2d 1420 (10th Cir.
July 22, 1991), as amended, 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1991). At least at this time, § 27A has
been successful in reinstating the case. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 1992 WL 201143 (10th Cir.
Aug. 24, 1992).
165. 137 CONG. REC. S17356 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement by Sen. Domenici).
166. The phrase is that of Sen. Bryan. 137 CONG. Rac. S18624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991).
167. 137 CoNG. REC. H11811 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (letter of Rep. Dingell); id. S17307
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Riegle). The FDIC was also concerned that the federal
program of litigation against those alleged to have been guilty of fraud in the savings and loan
scandals would be seriously affected. Id. S 18625 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
168. Id. S17356 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici); id. 517306 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Riegle); id. H11811-12 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (letter of Rep.
Dingell); id. S18624 (statement of Sen. Bryan).
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A short amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
put into the miscellaneous provisions of a bill to bail out the federal
bank insurance fund as section 476 of the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991.169 Congress passed the Act on November 27, 1991, and the
President signed it on December 19, 1991.170 This enacted into law
a new section 27A of the Exchange Act,171 which in effect undid
Lampfs retroactivity and returned section 10(b) limitations periods
nationwide to whatever they were on the day before Lampf was
decided. The legislation included a provision that revived actions
dismissed under Lampfif they would have been timely filed as of the
day before that decision.1 72 The first reported decision on the
constitutionality of the new statute came about two weeks after its
enactment, based on motions filed the day after its enactment.
173
E. The Courts' Response to Congress
Federal courts are usually quite reluctant to hold that legislation
is unconstitutional, and will construe a statute so as to avoid
constitutional problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.174 However, as of this writing, about one-
third of the district court cases in which the issue was reached held
169. Pub. L No. 102-242, 105 stat. 2236.
170. Ma
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1991).
172. The new legislation provides as follows:
(a) Effect on Pending Causes ofAction - The limitation period for any private civil action
implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991,
shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including
principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on Dismissed Causes ofAction - Any private civil action implied under section
10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991-
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991 and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitations period provided
by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity,
as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the
plaintiff not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this section.
Pub. L No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
173. Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,1992).
174. See, e.g., Edward . DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
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section 27A to be unconstitutional. 175 Approximately two-thirds of
the district courts, and the two appellate courts that ruled on the
matter, have held that the statute violates no provision of the
Constitution.176
The courts holding section 27A unconstitutional have based their
decisions primarily on one of three grounds. Some courts reasoned
that under the Supreme Court's 1871 decision in United States v.
175. See Mancino v. International Technology Corp., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) [1991-92
Transfer Binder], 96,614 at 92,891 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1992); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.
Supp. 587 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 1992) and 1992 WL 125365 (E.D. La. May 20, 1992); Johnston v.
Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 1992), reconsideration denied (May 20, 1992);
Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 1992); In
re Brichard Sec. Lit., 788 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp.,
No. 90-2600 JPV (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6,1992) (cited in Fry v. UAL Corp., 1992 WL 177086 (N.D. Ill.
July 23, 1992)); Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 91-F-591 (D. Colo. June 15, 1992);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 1992); Dulude v. Cigna Sec.,
Inc., No. 90 CV 72191-DT (S.D. Mich. May 4,1992) (cited in Fry v. UAL Corp., 1992 WL 177086
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 1992)); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., No. 1:90-CV-105 (W.D. Mich. May 7, 1992)
(cited in Fry v. UAL Corp., 1992 WL 177086 (N.D. 111. July 23, 1992)); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F.
Supp. 1054 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 1992); In re Prudential-Bache Energy Income Partnerships See.
Litig., 1992 WL 142575 (S.D. La. June 9, 1992). The three Colorado cases are no longer valid
authority, in light of Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 1992 WL 201143 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992).
176. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 1992 WL 201143 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992);
Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1992); Ayers v.
Sutliffe, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder] 1 96,552 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 1992);
Venturtech I v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 1992); First v.
Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder], 96,622 at 92,918
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1992); TBG Inc. v. Bendis, Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder],
96,623 at 92,920 (D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1992); Fred Hindler, Inc. v. Telequest, Inc., Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder], 96,634 at 92,989 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1992); Axel Johnson, Inc.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1992); Brown v. Hutton Group, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1991-92 Transfer Binder], 96,624 at 92,924 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1992); Adler
v. Berg Harmon Associates, 790 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1992); Wegbreit v. Marley
Orchards Corp., 793 F.Supp. 965 (F.D. Wash. May 11, 1992); Cortes v. Gratkowski, 795 F. Supp.
248 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1992); In re Taxable Municipal Bond Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 119990 (S.D. La.
May 20, 1992); In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.
1424 (D. Ariz. June 18, 1992); Maio v. Advanced Filtration Systems Ltd., 795 F.Supp. 1364 (SD.
Pa. June 17, 1992); Lmdy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1992);
Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 1992 WL 192056 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1992); Fry v. UAL Corp., 1992 WL
177086 (N.D. IlL. July 23, 1992); Morin v. Trupin, 1992 WL 182904 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1992);
Kalmanson v. McLaughlin, 1992 WL 190139 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1992); Barrv. McGraw Hill, 1992
WL 196754 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992); Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 1992 WL 197412 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 4, 1992); Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 1992 WL 196592 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1992); see also
Litton Industr., Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [Current]
96,814 at 93,244 n.6 (2d Cir. June 17, 1992) (Court did not decide question because limitations
defense waived, but noted it was "unimpressed by the cogency of [the] analysis of the courts that
held § 27A to be unconstitutional).
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Klein,17 7 section 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine
because Congress enacted a new statute of limitations and applied it
to pending cases. Separation of powers is violated because Congress
tells a court what law not to apply without enacting a new law of its
own. These courts concluded that while Klein is not implicated when
Congress changes a law, section 27A is not a change in the law, but
instead, prescribes a rule for implementing an existing law. 178 Other
courts adapted Justice Scalia's Beam concurrence and held that courts
cannot rule in a manner that embodies "selective prospectivity," and
that Congress cannot impose such an approach on the courts. 
179
Finally, some courts objected to the second portion of section 27A,
and held that Congress lacks the constitutional power to pass
legislation which has the effect of reopening final judgments.18
0
Judicial attacks on section 27A's constitutionality are open to
question. First, Klein does not extend beyond prohibiting Congress
from dictating how a court should decide a question of fact in a case
or from binding a court by a rule of law independently unconsti-
177. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 147 (1871).
178. Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 1992), reconsideration
denied (May 20, 1992); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 1092 (D.
Colo. Mar. 20, 1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992). Two
cases that have held § 27A unconstitutional on other grounds have also held that the statute does not
violate the principles of United States v. Klein: TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La.
Mar. 18, 1992); and Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 1992).
179. TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F.Supp. 587 (ED. La. Mar. 18, 1992); In re Brichard Sec.
Litig., 788 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992); In re Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc. Energy
Partnerships Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 142575 (E.D. La. June 9, 1992).
180. TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587 (ED. La. May 20, 1992); Johnston v. Cigna
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 1992) reconsideration denied (May 20, 1992); In re
Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 789
F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 1992); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054 (ED. Mich. June 5,
1992).
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tutional on other grounds." Section 27A clearly does not violate
either of these parameters. 8 2
The Supreme Court recently held that Congress did not run afoul
of Klein when it passed new legislation in the middle of pending
litigation, deeming particular activities in which the plaintiffs had
engaged to be in compliance with the statute that was being liti-
gated."8 3 The Court held that the new legislation was constitutional
because it did not direct any particular findings of fact or applications
of law to fact, but simply changed the law.1 Section 27A did no
more. It was a new law that created new rights and obligations in an
area that is usually left to legislatures."8 5 Furthermore, section 27A
did not affect the merits of or find facts in any controversy, and it was
not an attempt to prescribe the outcome of any court's review on the
merits.
1 86
181. In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982,992 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); National Juvenile Law Ctr., Inc. v. Regnery, 738 F.2d 455,
465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Its scope may well be narrower than this. See Gordon C. Young,
Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein
Revisited, 1981 WIs. L RLy. 1189, 1230-33 (arguing that Klein prohibits Congress only from
discriminating against classes of plaintiffs in determining federal court jurisdiction). A full analysis
of Klein is beyond the scope of this Article. Scholarly treatments of the subject may be found in,
inter alia, Young, supra at 1189-1262; Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress IsAuthority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 70-77,
87-88 (1981); Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L RLv. 1362, 1372-73 & n.39 (1953). The case dealt with the
interplay between timber management regulations and federal environmental law, and the particulars
are beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that whatever
the proper scope of Klein is, the decision does not extend as far as these courts would extend it.
182. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
183. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (March 25, 1992).
184. Id. at 1414.
185.. For the proposition that statutes of limitations are usually left to legislatures, see, e.g.,
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945); Jackson v. Larmphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280,290 (1830); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 167 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
186. The discussion in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,407 (1980), also
shows that this is a factor in favor of the constitutionality of § 27A.
One court recognized that Congress could have written an express statute of limitations into §
10(b) and applied it retroactively. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1092,
1098; see also In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1104 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992).
This seems to suggest that Congress could have constitutionally passed a statute that had precisely
the same effect as § 27A, as long as it was not quite so obvious that Congress was addressing a
problem created by a Supreme Court decision, but that § 27A is unconstitutional because it obviously
addresses that problem. This is not only an exaltation of form over substance, it is also wrong. See
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Second, nothing in the Constitution itself prohibits Congress from
applying its own statutes only to a particular class of litigants, or
from legislating retroactively or partially retroactively."8 7 As long
as there is a rational basis for both the legislation and for the manner
in which it is applied (i.e., retroactively, partially retroactively, etc.),
and no interference with vested property fights, Congress may apply
economic legislation in any way it wants.' Section 27A's
differentiation clearly has a rational basis. Even if "similarly situated
litigants should be treated alike," Congress could determine that
persons who had section 10(b) claims pending as of June 20, 1991,
were not similarly situated to persons who did not have section 10(b)
claims pending as of June 20, 1991. As to the former category,
"Lampfchanged the rules in the middle of the game for thousands of
fraud victims who already had suits pending.""8 9 This is certainly
a rational basis for changing the rules back. 1°
Finally, there is no constitutional impediment to the portion of
section 27A that allows final judgments to be reopened. Two
objections have been made to section 27A in this regard: That
directing the judiciary to open a judgment interferes with the
functioning of the judiciary,' 9' and that it deprives litigants of
vested rights.192 The two will be examined in turn.
infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
187. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,729-30 (1984); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorm Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
188. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 729-30; Usery, 428 U.S. at 17-18.
189. 137 CoNG. REc. S18623 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
190. The class differentiation is actually not perfect. If an individual was defrauded in
December 1989 and learned of the fraud at that time, and lived in a state that was governed by a
three-year limitations period, that individual may have thought that an action could be brought at any
time before December 1992, and thus may not have brought the action by the date of the Lampf
decision (June 20, 1991). That individual's action would be barred under Lampf, and not saved by
§ 27A. This imperfection may well have resulted from the fact that § 27A was a compromise worked
out as time was running out on a session of Congress, to ensure that the most immediate problem
of Lampfs retroactivity was addressed. 137 CONG. REc. S18624 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Bryan). The fact that the differentiation is not perfect, however, does not mean that it lacks a rational
basis; see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
191. Trieber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 1992); In re Brichard Sec.
Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1992); Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp.
1098, 1102 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 1992).
192. Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1098; Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, 789 F. Supp. 231, 234 (E.D.
Ky. Apr. 13, 1992).
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The "interfering with the functioning of the judiciary" argument
appears similar to the erroneous United States v. Klein separation of
powers argument described above, and it is difficult to see what other
"judicial power" objection could be raised. There is certainly nothing
sacrosanct about judgments per se. The broad proposition has been
stated that Congress cannot disturb a final judgment of a federal
court, 93 but federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
upheld statutes which have had precisely this effect.1 94 While it is
doubtful that Congress may pass legislation abrogating or modifying
a judicial determination of the merits, there are many changes
Congress can effect in judicial determinations without doing so.
Congress may cause dismissals or judgments to be opened by
redefining terms in one of its own statutes, 195 adding new legal
defenses or taking away old ones,1 96 removing procedural hur-
dles,I97 giving effect to a valid statute,"9 ' or correcting mistakes
in the execution of a statute'" or in other matters where correction
is necessary.2"
Thus, a legislature may constitutionally provide that a second
action can be brought after a dismissal of the first on a ground not
related to the merits. °1 This is especially true in the cases dis-
193. Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923); United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. (89
U.S.) 641, 47-48 (1874); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 421,
423 (1856).
194. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
195. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) at 423.
196. See 149 Madison Avenue Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 795 (1947) (on reconsideration of
331 U.S. 199 (1947)) (affirming judgment of Court of Appeals, but remanding in light of statute
enacted nine days after original Supreme Court decision), on remand, 79 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. N.Y.
1948); Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co. v. Robertson, 331 U.S. 793 (1947) (on reconsideration of
331 U.S. 823 (1947)) (to same effect).
197. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980); Cherokee Nation v.
United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486 (1926); Bonnar v. United States, 438 F.2d 540, 574 (Ct. Cl. 1971);
Smith v. McNeil, 109 U.S. 426, 429 (1883).
198. Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 627, 660-61 (1829).
199. Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1921).
200. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 88 (1834).
201. Smith v. McNeil, 109 U.S. at 429. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), promulgated
under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, provides that a plaintiff may file a first notice of
dismissal of an action at any time before the defendant serves an answer or a motion for summary
judgment, and that such notice operates as a dismissal without prejudice. The Rules Enabling Act is
part of the "long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts."
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.460, 473 (1965). Accordingly, "Congress may certainly delegate to others,
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missed under the new Lampfrule. Since actions dismissed under the
newly created limitations period were not dismissed on the merits,
Congress did not interfere with any judicial decisions on the merits
in undoing the retroactive effect of Lampf.
The second objection is that Congress takes away "vested rights"
by allowing judgments to be reopened." 2 This objection would
undoubtedly have merit in other situations. For example, if a private
individual were paid a money judgment from an underlying action,
it is highly doubtful that Congress could pass legislation subjecting
that money judgment to relitigation. In such a case, the judgment
would long since have become a vested property right, and Congress
cannot take away a vested right by legislation.
203
There is no vested right in ajudgment alone, however, without an
adjudication on the merits. It is settled law that absent a statute or
rule to the contrary, a judgment that is not based on the merits is not
an actual determination of the claim, but simply a refusal to hear it,
and thus does not bar subsequent actions. 20 This rule has been
applied to dismissals on statute of limitations grounds as well.20"
powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23
U.S.) 1, 43 (1825). Congress thus has every power to pass a statute allowing actions to be reopened
in the manner that Rule 41(a) permits under the Congressional delegation in the Rules Enabling Act.
202. Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1098; Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, 789 F. Supp. 231, 234 (E.D.
Ky. Apr. 13, 1992).
203. See, e.g., Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Insular Collector of Customs, 297 U.S. 666, 671
(1936); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123 (1898).
204. 1B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACICE 1 0.405[5] at 228, 0.409[1.-2] at 308 (3d
ed. 1988); Segal v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 606 F.2d 842, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1979)
(want of subject matter jurisdiction); Miller v. United States Postal Service, 729 F.2d 1033, 1035 n.4
(5th Cir. 1984) (want of subject matter jurisdiction); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285-86
(1969) (want of prosecution); St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton-Press Co., 127 U.S. 614, 618-19
(1888) (dismissal for want of indispensable parties); House v. Muller, 22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 42, 46
(1874) (misjoinder). See generally Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 232,237 (1866) ("If
the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or parties, or a misconception of the form of
proceedings or the want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the
merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit.").
205. See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 625 (1885); Brent v. Bank of Washington, 10
Pet. (35 U.S.) 596, 617 (1836); Bank of United States v. Donnelly, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 361, 371-73
(1834); Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 651 F.2d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1981); Jimenez v.
Toledo, 576 F.2d 402,404 (1st Cir. 1979); Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540,541-42 (2d
Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 678 (1934); lB J. MOORE, supra note 204, 0.409[6] at 338-39;
RESTATEMENT (2D) JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. f, reporter's notes; RESTATEMENT (2D) CONFLICT Op LAwS
§ 110, cmts. a, b.
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Absent rule or statute to the contrary, there is no vested right in the
running of a statute of limitations to cut off a remedy. 206 As a
result, Congress interferes with no rights when it revives actions that
have been dismissed on limitations grounds.
The one thing that the courts which have ruled on the consti-
tutionality issue have in common is their belief that prior to section
27A, Beam mandated that the new rule of law in Lampf be applied
retroactively. 2 7 Every court that has considered the issue has held
to the same effect, and for the same reason: Six Justices in Beam
agreed that when a court applies a rule of law to the litigants in one
case, it must do so with respect to litigation in all other pending
cases, and Lampf applied its new rule of law to the litigants in that
case.20 ' That assumption, however, deserves further scrutiny.
II. R-TROACTIV1TY DECISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Courts have long proclaimed fealty to the established rule that
judicial decisions operate retroactively.2" Nonetheless, they have
created exceptions allowing prospective-only operation of new rules
While the Second Circuit no longer recognizes this rule, this is a direct result of the enactment
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 and does not alter the general proposition. Sack v. Low, 478
F.2d 360, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1973).
206. Campbell, 115 U.S. at 624-25. Accord Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314-15 (1945);.Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243
(1976); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989).
A different result might occur if the "statute of limitations" is of the more unusual form that
actually extinguishes a liability rather than merely denying the plaintiff a remedy. See lB J. MOORE,
supra note 204, 10.409[6] at 334-335. In those cases, ones in which the same enactment that creates
the liability also defines a finite term of the liability's existence, retroactive application of a now
statute of limitations to reverse a time bar may sometimes amount to a taking of property. William
Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & S.I.R., 268 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1925) (distinguished in Chase Securities
Corp., 325 U.S. at 312 n.8). That principle, however, is based on legislative intent, and does not
automatically apply merely because the time bar is in the same statute with the legislatively enacted
right. Electrica4 Radio & Machine Workers, 429 U.S. at 243; Burnett v. New York Cent. Ry. Co.,
380 U.S. 424, 427 n.2 (1965). Whatever the parameters of the latter type of limitations period, the
private right of action under § 10(b) is not a creature of statute. Therefore, it cannot fit into the
second category of limitations periods, and there is no vested right in the running of the limitations
period set by Lampf.
207. For cases that have ruled on the issue, see supra notes 175-76.
208. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
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of law in situations where rigid adherence to a doctrine of retro-
activity would result in injustice.21 Thus, in order to examine
Beam's effect on the retroactivity of Lampf, it is helpful to review
briefly the evolution of the law of retroactivity in the Supreme Court.
A. The Civil Cases Up to 1991
From the beginning of the American judicial system, courts did
not hesitate to declare that a new rule of law would only be applied
nonretroactively in situations where retroactive application would
create an injustice. For example, in one early case, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that it would not nullify previously granted legislative
divorces, even though it decided that such divorces were void.2"
Fifteen years later, the United States Supreme Court held that
bondholders could demand payment on bonds issued by a state's
legislature under repeated decisions of the state's supreme court that
the legislature had the power to issue the bonds, even though the state
court later reversed itself and held that the legislature was not so
empowered.2" There are numerous other examples of decisions in
which the Supreme Court has declined to apply a judicial decision
retroactively.213 One principle underlying such decisions was that
a rule of law might create expectations on which people relied in
fixing property or contract rights, and, once rights were settled based
on such legitimate reliance interests, they should not be undone by a
mere change in judicial decision.21 4 For example, one would not
210. See infra notes 237 & 256 and accompanying text
211. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848).
212. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 220, 221 (1863).
213. See, e.g., Muhlkerv. New York& Harlem Ry. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Loeb v. Trustees
of Columbia Township, 179 U.S. 472,492-93 (1900); German Savings Bank v. Franklin County, 128
U.S. 526 (1881); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 677 (1871).
214. "After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far
as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself."
Douglass, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 687; accord, e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S.
472, 486 (1924); Kenosha v. Lamson, 76 U.S. (9 Wallace) 477, 486 (1869); Lee County v. Rogers,
74 U.S. (7 Wallace) 181, 183-84 (1868); Minnesota Mining Co. v. National Mining Co., 70 U.S. (3
Wallace) 332, 334 (1865); Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wallace.) 294, 303 (1865). The
most common applications of the principle were in the areas of property rights, contract rights and
reliance of public officials on an old law. Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes
Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1946).
355
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 24
now expect that a new judicial decision holding that all deeds were
void unless written on legal-sized paper would be applied retro-
actively to void deeds that were written on letter-sized paper.
Although the first true Supreme Court application of prospective
decisionmaking to protect reliance interests was in 1863, even Chief
Justice Marshall agreed that "in private cases between individuals, a
court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which
will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties .... ""'
This principle has also been used in more modem Supreme Court
cases, although more as a principle of equity to fashion a new
decision than for any perceived constitutional or statutory reason.216
Not every new judicial decision, however, was applied by the
Supreme Court on a nonretroactive basis, even if contract or property
rights had been settled in reliance on the overruled decision.2 7 The
Court did not allow persons whose rights had been settled by a final
judgment and res judicata to reopen the judgment based on a change
in law.2"' Further, the Court made clear that it would not apply new
state-law decisions retroactively in cases emanating from state courts,
even if it might apply such decisions nonretroactively in cases
emanating from federal courts, or in situations where there was no
claim of invalidity of state law.219
215. U.S. v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801).
216. See, e.g., Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,213 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S.
701, 706 (1969); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973) (affirming District
Court's refusal to enjoin state from reimbursing parochial schools based on statute held by Supreme
Court to be unconstitutional, because school budgets were adopted and expenses incurred before
Court decision in reliance on statute).
217. Chicot Co. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940).
218. k4/
219. See, e.g., Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29,31-32 (1924); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U.S. 444,450 (1924); Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Electric Installation Co., 234 U.S. 619,
624-25 (1914); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1895).
There was apparently a reason for this distinction. In cases emanating from state courts, the
Supreme Court was bound to accept the most recent decision of a state's highest court on a given
subject as the authoritative construction of state law. See, e.g., Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S.
at 110-11. Thus, it was bound to apply the newest state court decision in a field of law, even if that
newest decision overruled a prior decision on which individuals may have relied in settling property
and contract interests. Since the state tribunal was the final word on state law, no federal question
was presented by a state court's merely overruling prior decisions, even if parties had contracted in
reliance on the old law. Central Land Co., 159 U.S. at 111-12. By contrast, in cases emanating from
federal courts, the Supreme Court perceived itself able to construe state law for itself under the
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The principle of prospective application of judicial decisions
received its strongest Supreme Court support in Justice Cardozo's
opinion in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co0.22 There, the plaintiff claimed that the Montana Supreme Court
acted unconstitutionally in applying one of its overruling decisions
on a prospective-only basis, thereby denying that plaintiff the benefit
of the new rule of law. 2 ' The Court, however, held that "the
federal Constitution has no voice" on the subject of whether a state
should apply its judicial decisions prospectively or retro-
spectively. ' A state may choose either depending on the juristic
philosophy of its courts and their conception of law, its origin, and its
nature.223 If Montana's highest court held that an overruling
decision was to be given prospective effect only, that was a
declaration of the common law as established by Montana's judges,
who were empowered to say that application of an earlier rule of law
as precedent compelled an affirmance on the merits but that a
different rule of law was likely to be applied in the future. 2  The
Court held that the federal Constitution does not require anything to
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842), and could therefore pick the overruled
decision as representing the true "state law." It could then hold that the newer state decision could
not be implemented without some violation of the federal Constitution. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 n.8 (1930); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. at 452-54;
Loeb, 179 U.S. at 493; see also Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) at 206-07 ('We shall
never immolate truth, justice and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed
the sacrifice.").
The federallstate court distinction seems somewhat strained. If there is a constitutional problem
with application of an overruling decision in cases emanating from federal courts, based on the fact
that people should not have rights taken away based on their good-faith reliance on a now-superseded
law, the constitutional problem would appear to be based on deprivation of the reliance interest,
Edward S. Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MIncH L.
REv. 30,56 (1939); Albert Kocourek and Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through
Stare Decisis, 29 lL. L. REv. 971, 997 (1935), and would not vary depending on what court the
action was brought in. If protection of reliance interests does not rise to the level of a constitutional
doctrine, as it often does not, then the analysis was unjustified in either federal or state court. But
this was the line of analysis nonetheless.
220. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
221. Id. at 363.
222. Id. at 364.
223. Id.
224. This was an approach that Justice Cardozo had espoused earlier that year in an address
before the New York State Bar Association. See New York State Bar Association Report 1932:294-
96.
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the contrary in the way of the binding force of precedent or the
meaning of the judicial process.' The result was, in effect, that
either prospective or retrospective decisionmaking by state courts is
permitted by the Constitution. 6
The Supreme Court summarized its approach to civil retroactivity
in the 1971 case of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.' 7 There, the Court
considered a lawsuit by a worker who had been injured in an accident
on a fixed offshore drilling rig that was brought under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act.228 The Lands Act was a federal
statutory scheme which had previously been construed by lower
federal courts to incorporate the general body of admiralty law,
including the equitable doctrine of laches.229 While the Huson
action was pending, the Supreme Court held for the first time, in
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"M that the remedy for
personal injuries on fixed offshore drilling rigs must be derived from
local law, made applicable by the Lands Act, and not from general
admiralty law.23' As a result, the one-year state personal injury
limitations period, rather than the doctrine of laches, was the time bar
that applied to such actions. 2 Since Gaines Ted Huson brought his
lawsuit slightly over two years after his accident, 3 he would have
been unable to bring an action anywhere if his federal action had
been dismissed.2"
The Chevron Oil Court held that Rodrigue required the appli-
cation of the one-year Louisiana limitations period to actions under
the Lands Act, which, if applied to Huson's case, would have barred
his action. 5 It further held, however, that this rule would not be
225. Great Northern Ry. Co., 287 U.S. at 364-66.
226. Id. at 365-66.
227. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
228. Id. at 98-99.
229. Id. at 107.
230. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
231. Id. at 355.
232. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 105.
233. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S.
97 (1971).
234. The state court action would have been barred under the one-year Louisiana limitations
period that Rodrigue and Chevron Oil also applied to Lands Act cases in Louisiana.
235. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 105.
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applied retroactively to bar the action. 6 The Chevron Oil Court
reviewed the evolution of nonretroactivity in civil cases, and
concluded that it customarily examined three factors to determine
whether new civil caselaw should be applied retroactively: 1)
Whether the decision established a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed; 2) the equities of the particular situation, based
on the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation would further or retard its operation;
and 3) the injustice or hardship of retroactive application of the new
law.
237
Chevron Oil remained the established approach to civil retro-
activity questions until the Beam decision. In fact, the dissenters in
Lampf and Data Access cited Chevron Oil as a reason why the new
section 10(b) limitations period should be applied on a prospective-
only basis.
238
B. The Criminal Cases Up to 1987
Through the early 1960s, the Supreme Court had never applied a
new rule of criminal procedure on anything other than a fully
retroactive basis.239 This was changed by the series of Warren
Court decisions that greatly expanded the rights of criminal
236. Id. at 107-09.
237. Id. at 106-07.
238. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 11 S. Ct. 2773, 2786-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); In re Data
Access Systems Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1552-53 (3d Cir. 1988) (Seitz, J., dissenting).
239. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confession; rule applied
to petitioner); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) (per curiam) (applying retroactively right
to counsel decision in Gideon v. Wainwright); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (standard for federal
habeas relief applied to petitioner); Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms, 357 U.S.
214 (1958) (applying retroactively free transcript decision in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
The actual declaration of a new crime would not, however, be made retroactively, as this would entail
a punishment for a crime that did not previously exist, which worked a Due Process violation in
much the same way a similar legislative act would operate as an ex post facto law. Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). The repeal of a criminal act, by contrast, was applied retroactively.
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 27 (1934) (afftrming dismissal of indictment for violation of
National Prohibition Act when 21st Amendment repealing the Act was ratified prior to trial).
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defendants.24 The Warren Court was reluctant to invalidate
criminal convictions because the prosecution failed to use some
unanticipated requirement later created by the Court.24 Application
of the new rules of constitutional criminal procedure on a prospective
basis was the means chosen to effectuate "long overdue reforms,"
without having a strongly adverse effect on the administration of
justice.242
The first such reformatory decision was Linkletter v. Walker,243
a habeas corpus case. In Linkletter, the Court held that it would not
apply the new federal exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio24 retro-
actively to invalidate a pre-Mapp conviction obtained through
illegally seized evidence. 5 The Court reached this decision even
though it had reversed the conviction of Dollree Mapp in her own
case, and had also applied the new exclusionary rule to cases that
were pending on direct review at the time Mapp was decided.246 It
held that the Constitution neither requires nor prohibits the
retrospective effect of decisions.247 The Court reasoned that
because Mapp was intended to deter illegal police action, the retro-
active effect of that decision would not serve that purpose, and,
instead, would have a highly deleterious effect on the administration
of justice.248 In later cases, the Court made clear that it would only
consider prospective application of a newly declared criminal rule
when that rule was a "clear break with the past."249 The rule also
240. See infra note 251 (citing some cases where the Warren Court expanded the rights of
criminal defendants).
241. These were generally "prophylactic" rules adopted by the Court to help ensure that
criminal defendants received the full benefit of their constitutional rights or to deter violations of
those rights. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 52-54 (1973).
242. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969).
243. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
244. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
245. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-40.
246. Id. at 622 & n.
247. Id. at 629.
248. Id. at 637-38.
249. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 672
(1973).
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had to be procedural in nature and one that affected the central truth-
seeking function of the federal courts.2
°
Linkletter spawned a series of High Court decisions refusing to
apply new court-made rules of criminal procedure on a fully
retroactive basis."1 In some cases, the Court used what the recent
Beam decision called "selective prospectivity," applying the new
decision to the litigants before it, but not to other litigants whose case
was pending on direct or collateral review at that time. 2 The Court
believed that it was required to apply the new rule to the parties
before it as "an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that
constitutional adjudication not stand as mere dictum." 3 However,
it believed that retroactive application of the new rule to other
250. See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433,454-55 (1974) (plurality opinion); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646,653 (1971)
(plurality opinion).
251. Th early cases include: Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (no-
comment rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), applied prospectively); Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (right-to-silence and right-to-counsel rules of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), applied prospectively); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (lineup evidence rules of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1965), applied prospectively); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S.
631 (1968) (jury trial rules in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968), applied prospectively); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (rule regarding
violation of federal wiretap statutes in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), applied prospectively);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
applying exclusionary rule to wiretap evidence, applied prospectively); Halliday v. United States, 394
U.S. 831 (1969) (implementation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 set forth in McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969), applied prospectively); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (rule applying
Miranda to retrials after date of decision applied prospectively); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667 (1971) (plurality opinion) (rules regarding Fifth Amendment consequences of tax returns in
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968),
applied prospectively); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (rule relating to searches
incident to arrest in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), applied prospectively); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing established in Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), implemented prospectively); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973)
(decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), relating to sentencing after retrial, applied
prospectively); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973) (plurality opinion) (decision in O'Caliahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), pertaining to jurisdiction of military tribunals, applied prospectively);
Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975),
relating to exclusion of women from jury pool, applied prospectively).
252. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966).
253. StovaU, 388 U.S. at 301.
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pending cases "would seriously disrupt the administration of our
criminal laws." 
2 4
In Stovall v. Denno, 5 the Court set forth three factors derived
from Linkletter to determine whether new criminal rules would be
applied prospectively: 1) The purpose to be served by the new
standards; 2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities
on the old standards; and 3) the effect on the administration of justice
of a retroactive application of the new standards.5 6 In Stovall and
subsequent cases, however, the Court was somewhat inconsistent in
its determinations of precisely which class of litigants would be the
beneficiaries of a new rule,"7 perhaps because the Court deemed
such application to be a matter of judicial discretion.5
8
Some Justices who initially supported prospective application of
new rules of criminal law later changed their minds. In Desist v.
United States,"s9 Justice Harlan objected to the Court's prospective-
only application of a prior decision holding that wiretap evidence is
inadmissible without judicial authorization. 20 Although Justice
Harlan had joined the majority in Stovall v. Denno and other
decisions that espoused prospective application of new rules of law,
his Desist dissent instead suggested a belief that full retroactivity was
required for all cases still subject to direct review at the time of a new
decision. He stated that after a new rule of constitutional law is
declared, the "judicial tradition" requires that the rule be applied to
every future litigant, so that judicial decisions have legitimacy and
are not simply "the commands of a super-legislature." 61
254. Id. at 300 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,731 (1966)).
255. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
256. Id. at 296-97.
257: See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at
270 n.2 (Fortas, ., dissenting).
258. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969).
259. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
260. Id at 257-58 (referring to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
261. Desist, 394 U.S. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Justice Harlan wrote:
When another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same relief
or give a printipled reason for acting differently. We depart from this basic judicial
tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those
who alone will receive the benefit of a "new" rule of constitutional law.... [I]t is the
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Justice Harlan reiterated his view that a new rule of constitutional
law should be applied retroactively to all cases pending before the
courts in his concurrence in Mackey v. United States,262 a case in
which a plurality opinion of the Supreme Court declined to apply
retroactively two prior holdings expanding the scope of the Fifth
Amendment in tax cases.2"3 He objected again to the Court's
seemingly acting like a legislature, "making its new constitutional
rules wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it deems
wise. 'a 6 Instead, retroactivity must be determined based on prin-
ciples that comport with the judicial function, not on considerations
of policy that legislatures would use.2' In Justice Harlan's view,
automatic retroactivity of judicial decisions was necessary in order
for a court to function not as a legislature, but as a court applying the
"rule of law":
Refusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising on direct
review... tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent,
allowing us to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately
created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare
decisis, a force which ought properly to bear on the judicial resolution of
any legal problem.26
C. The Abandonment of Stovall ln Criminal Cases, And Its Effect on
Civil Retroactivity
The Court adhered to the Stovall approach in criminal cases until
its 1987 decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,2 67 in which it adopted
task of this Court... to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. It is
only if our decisions can be justified in terms of this fundamental premise that they may
properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the
commands of a super-legislature.
l
262. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
263. Id at 675 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan's concurrence, which brought in the fifth
and sixth votes in the majority, argued that the evidence was admissible without any need for a
retroactivity analysis. Id. at 702 & n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 680-81 (Harlan, J. , dissenting) (citations omitted).
267. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity in criminal cases.268 The
reasoning of Griffith undermines Chevron Oil in the civil context,
even though the latter case has not technically been overruled and
Griffith was said not to apply to civil cases.269
Griffith used Justice Harlan's doctrine of automatic retroactivity
as a means of preventing a court from acting like a legislature. That
doctrine, however, creates a major problem in the context of Lampf.
If preventing a court from acting like a legislature is a central purpose
of automatic retroactivity, then automatic retroactivity may serve no
purpose-and may indeed be counterproductive-when the court
independently decides to act like a legislature, such as when it creates
a limitations period that did not exist before.
1. The Griffith Decision
In Griffith, the Court held that it was obligated to apply
retroactively to cases pending on direct review its prior decision in
Batson v. Kentucky,27 which held it unconstitutional for prose-
cutors to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of race. It thus
reversed the petitioner's conviction.27'
The adoption of a principle of automatic retroactivity, or
application of a new rule of law to all cases pending in the courts at
the time the new rule is announced, was an explicit adoption of
Justice Harlan's views in Desist and Mackey.'72 The Court
summarized the views of Justice Harlan by setting forth two basic
principles on which those views rested: 1) After a new rule is decided
in a case, the "integrity of judicial review" requires that the same rule
be applied to all similar cases pending on direct review, and 2)
Similarly situated litigants should be treated the same.7 The first
268. Id. at 322.
269. 1. at 322 n.8.
270. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
271. The Court later refused to apply Batson to cases that had been final at the time of that
decision, but in which the petitioners sought to use the new rule of law in a collateral attack on their
convictions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
272. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
273. IAt at 322-23.
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principle was a restatement of Justice Harlan's objection to the Court
acting as a legislature,274 while the second was his chosen means
of avoiding inequity.2 75
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, dissented. Justice White would have applied the Stovall
test, thus concluding that because of the extent of prosecutorial and
court reliance on the 21-year-old precedent overruled by Batson,276
the Batson decision should not have been applied retroactively. 277
Justice White also expressed the view that the Griffith approach did
not accomplish the ends sought by Justice Harlan.278 It did not
prevent the court from assuming the role of a legislature, because that
is a question that goes to the substance of the Court's decisions far
more than to retroactivity.279 Moreover, Griffith did not treat
similarly situated litigants alike because it irrationally differentiated
between cases on direct review and those in collateral pro-
ceedings.
280
Although Griffith itself proclaimed to the contrary, that decision
called into serious question the applicability of Chevron Oil to
matters of civil retroactivity.
2. The Status of Chevron Oil After Griffith
The Griffith Court expressly stated that Chevron Oil would
continue to govern in the civil retroactivity area, 28 1 and, after
Griffith, the Court continued to use Chevron Oil in civil cases.
28 2
The subsequent Beam opinion, however, adopted part of Griffith for
civil cases. Beam rejected the Chevron Oil approach in civil cases
274. Id at 323.
275. Id.
276. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The former rule that peremptory challenges could
be exercised for any reason, an imagined reason or no reason did not originate with Swain, but was
always the rule until the Batson decision. Eg., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
277. Grifflith, 479 U.S. at 333-34 (White, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 330-33 (White, ., dissenting).
279. Id. at 330-31 (White, ., dissenting).
280. Id. at 330-32 & 333 n2 (White, ., dissenting).
281. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 n.8.
282. Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223,230 (1988); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,
662 (1987); Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987).
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where the new rule of law was applied to the litigants who were
before the Court when it was prescribed.283 Beam thus signaled that
the Court would not apply new decisions with "selective
prospectivity" in either the civil or the criminal context.2"
There is serious doubt as to whether Chevron Oil has any vitality
at all under current Supreme Court precedents. Linkletter held that
there is no distinction between civil and criminal litigation for
purposes of determining the judiciary's power to apply its decisions
other than retroactively. 5 Perhaps as a result, there is a marked
similarity between the civil retroactivity approach set forth in
Chevron Oil, and the criminal retroactivity approach set forth in
Stovall only four years earlier. The Stovall approach has three
components to a determination of whether to apply new judicial
decisions retroactively: Purpose, effect, and reliance.286 The
Chevron Oil approach contains what are in effect the same three
components as Stovall: Purpose, effect, and injustice, a variation of
reliance.287 Both Chevron Oil and the criminal retroactivity
standards are applicable only in situations where the new law is a
"clear break" from the old one.288 It has thus been observed that
283. See supra notes 236 and accompanying text.
284. Some courts have attempted to separate Beam from the Griffith/Harlan dissents by holding
that Griffith only applied to new constitutional rules. See, e.g., In re Taxable Mun. Bonds Sec. Litg.,
796 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. La. 1992). It is true that Griffith's holding came in the area of newly declared
constitutional rules in criminal cases. Justice Harlan spoke of the need to resolve all cases "in light
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles" and the Court's function of
"pronouncing new constitutional standards." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). But there is nothing in the reasoning of Griffith or Justice Harlan's opinions
in Desist and Mackey to suggest that this line of reasoning would be applied solely to criminal or
constitutional cases. To the contrary, Justice Harlan would have applied his reasoning to the area of
civil statutory interpretation as well. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,295-96 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). If the linchpins of Griffith are similar treatment of similarly situated litigants and the
"integrity of judicial review," these are not principles that are limited in application to now rules of
constitutional law. See also American Trucking Assn, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 214 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); James Beam Distilling Co.v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439,2450 (1991) (Scalia,
., concurring).
285. Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965).
286. See supra notes 237 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 256 and accompanying text.
288. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 184 (1990); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,544 n.1 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
366
1993 / The Prospective Application of Judicial Legislation
Chevron Oil was an adaptation of Stovall and related cases to the
context of civil cases.289 If the standards underlying Stovall and
Chevron Oil are essentially the same, and Stovall has been rejected
by the Supreme Court in the criminal context, then application of
precedent would lead to a rejection of Chevron Oil in the civil
context.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that Griffith's principle
of full retroactivity must be applied to every case. Griffith and the
related opinions of Justice Harlan emphasized the need for
retroactivity as a means of upholding the rule of law and of avoiding
the problem of ad hoc decisionmaking, such as judicial
legislation.2 ° As the passages quoted above and the rest of the
Desist and Mackey dissents show, Justice Harlan was especially
concerned with avoiding the problem of judiciary acting as
legislature, and "completely disagree[d]" with the point of view that
it could do so.29 This belief was a principal reason underlying his
defection from the Linkletter majority and espousal of full retro-
activity in the first place.
Since it adopted Justice Harlan's views in Desist and Mackey, the
current Supreme Court would presumably agree that retroactivity is
necessary to avoid the evil of judicial legislation.292 But if those
views are followed, what happens to the reason for full retroactivity
if the Court does engage in judicial legislation? What happens when
the Court itself mitigates the force of stare decisis by creating law
where none existed before, or restructures expectations created by
extant law? If the Court decides, even for the most legitimate of
reasons, to engage in the particular harmful activity which is to be
prevented by retroactive adjudication, then what purpose would be
289. Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years Of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique AndA Proposa4 61 VA.
L. REv. 1557, 1581-82 (1975); accord John B. Corr, Retroactivity: A Study In Supreme Court
Doctrine 'As Applied, 61 N.C. L REv. 745, 747 (1983).
290. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
291. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
292. The current Supreme Court has also followed Justice Harlan's views on the retroactivity
of new principles of law as applied to habeas corpus cases. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311
(1989).
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served in blind insistence on a method of adjudication that could not
prevent the supposed harm?
As the next section shows, nothing in the language or reasoning
of Beam or in the judicial power of the federal courts suggests that
automatic retroactivity is required in all cases. Rather, there is at least
one class of cases in which a federal court should consider applying
new law on a prospective basis only, not even to the parties before
the court. That class of cases involves "judicial legislation"-judicial
creation, rather than interpretation, of law.
III. THE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The term "judicial legislation" itself suggests an interrelationship
between two branches of government. The judiciary interprets laws
retrospectively, to apply them to all litigants or potential litigants
whose cases have not finally been decided.293 By contrast, the
legislature creates laws prospectively, to give notice of the legal
consequences of conduct to all who might engage in the conduct in
the future.2' As this section will show, when the judiciary creates
law as a legislature does, its lawmaking should be similarly subject
to prospective application.
A. The Retroactive Nature of Adjudication
Even if one adheres to the view that a federal court can, on
appropriate occasions, announce a new principle of law pros-
pectively, it is still the general rule that courts adjudicate retro-
actively.295 They customarily apply the legal principles on which
they decide cases to conduct that has already occurred, as well as to
conduct that has not yet occurred. A new rule of law promulgated by
a court is thus usually applied to the litigants before the court,
293. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct 2439,2443 (1991) (opinion
of Souter, 1.).
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litigants who have already begun their actions and whose cases are
still pending, and future litigants whose cases are not yet
pending.
2 96
The norm of retroactive application of judicial decisions
emanates from a theory of judicial decisionmaking known as the
"declaratory theory." 29 The declaratory theory, which states that
judges do not make law but merely "declare" what it is and has
always been, derives from Blackstone's maxim that a court is "not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
old one." 298 According to Blackstone, decisions should be
overruled only when they are "manifestly absurd or unjust."29 As
a result, when a court does overrule a prior decision, the old
(overruled) law is deemed never to have been law at all, but to have
been only a mistake." ° These views are derived from principles of
natural law,3" and are certainly understandable in that context,
because a law of nature would indeed be something that judges
would "find" and not "make."302 Since according to Blackstone, a
new law is deemed always to have been the law, truly orthodox
application of this theory would compel a court to apply all new
decisions retroactively; for if the new law is currently and was always
the law, there simply is no other law that could be applied to any
case, past or present.
296. Id.
297. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,542 n.7 (1982); Jackson v. Harris, 43 F.2d 513,
516 (10th Cir. 1930); Beam, 111 S. CL at 2443 (opinion of Souter, J.); American Trucking Assns.,
Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
298. 1 SIR WzuJAM BLACKsToNn, COMMENTARIES *69; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
622-23 (1965); Paul Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, Foreword: The High Court; The Great
Wri and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L REv. 56, 59-60 (1965).
299. 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 298, *70.
300. Id. *70-71; see, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
301. 1 WLAM BLACKSTONF, supra note 298, *70-71, *38-44; see also BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE op TmE JuDIcIAL PRocEss 131 (1921); Thomas Currier, Time and Change in Judge-
Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 206 (1965); B. Harold Levy, Realist
Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1960).
302. BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY (6th ed.) defines natural law as a system of law that can be
found from human nature "independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one
people." Id at 1026. It also refers to obligatory rules of human conduct "essential to the divine
purposes in the universe and ... promulgated by God through human reason." Id.
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The Blackstonian declaratory theory was, without doubt, the
governing theory of judicial decisionmaking before the 20th
century.3"s As discussed in the previous section, however, courts
sometimes strayed from a rigid interpretation of Blackstone when
retroactive application of a decision would affect property or contract
rights obtained in reliance on a decision.3 4
A literal interpretation of Blackstone might not have many
adherents today, as it rests on true legal fictions. First, it mandates
that a legal principle which was once announced and once existed can
later be said never to have existed at all, even though the principle
can still be viewed in permanently bound books, on microfiche and
CD-ROM, and in computerized retrieval systems. Second, it declares
that a principle of law which is set forth for the first time actually has
always existed since the beginning of time, which bears no relation
to the real world. Third, it assumes tacitly that there is one "law" to
be "found," a proposition which can have no validity in our federalist
and multijurisdictional judicial system.305 Thus, even judges and
commentators who have preferred a Blackstonian theory of judicial
decisionmaking have not necessarily taken Blackstone literally.
3°
Nonretroactive application of judicial decisions is derived from
the positivist/realist school of jurisprudence, which emanated from
the teachings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. Austin adhered to
303. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 n.7 (1982); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 623 (1965) ; Corr, supra note 289, at 746.
304. See supra notes 215-38 and accompanying text. In Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, discussed
supra note 219 and accompanying text, Justice Miller dissented from the majority's refusal to apply
an overruling precedent retroactively. His Blackstonian rationale was that an overruling decision does
not make law, but rather the law "was always the same as expounded by the [overruling] decision,
and [the] former decision was not, and never had been, the law, and [was] overruled for that very
reason." 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) at 211 (Miller, J., dissenting).
305. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). A similar principle may be found in Justice
Cardozo's opinion for the Court that the common law of a state is precisely what that state's judges
declare it to be, and that it is up to those judges to determine how that state will apply its judicial
decisions. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
306. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Mishkin, supra note 298, at 59-60; Note, The Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on
Intervening Transactions, 47 HARV. L REv. 1403, 1412 (1934).
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the view that judges actually do make law.3"7 This approach lends
itself particularly well to nonretroactive (prospective) overruling.
30 8
If judges recognize a power to make law through the decisions they
set forth, then they can adjudicate the cases before them (the primary
task of a judge) based on established principles on which a party
might have relied, while simultaneously declaring that the established
principle is wrong and making the new law that will be applied in the
future.
309
The Austinian view of judicial decisions'may be truer to reality
in some circumstances. Judges are not mindless automatons who do
no more than pick existing rules; they do have a creative
function .3 " However, if too much emphasis is placed on a court's
creative function, the court may move away from its role as neutral
decisionmaker, and more toward a role as arbiter of policy, or
legislator. 1  Prospective overruling is in essence a discretionary
declaration that whatever the law is or should be will not be applied
to the parties before the court, and thus embodies a sort of policy
determination as to the adjudication of the case before the court.
Because it involves discretionary or policy considerations rather than
a mechanistic application of the law to all parties, prospective
overruling is considered to be closer to legislation than is retroactive
overruling.312
By contrast, to say that judges merely "declare" the law, and
apply their decisions evenly to all who are before them (i.e.,
retroactively), tends to emphasize the neutrality of the judge. In
307. See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 191 (1832)
(H. Hart ed. 1954); Levy, supra note 301, at 28 & passim; Linklener, 381 U.S. at 623-24; Hill v.
Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691, 695 (1988).
308. See Levy, supra note 301, at 24-25.
309. Id. at 28; see B. CARDozo, supra note 301, at 113-15; New York State Bar Association
Address, supra note 224, at 294-96. Austin described the Blackstonian view of judicial decisions as
"the childish fiction ... that judiciary or common law is not made by [judges], but is a miraculous
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity and merely decided from time to time
by judges." 2 JoHN AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 655 (4th ed. 1873) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Durocher v. Lavallee, 330 F.2d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 1964) (en bane) ("Of course,
we are past the splendid myth of 'discovered law.'") (citing 1 W. BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES
*70), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).
310. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 301, 21, 115.
311. Eg., Mishdn, supra note 298, at 64-66.
312. Id.
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addition, cases are normally decided by applying the rule of law set
forth in the case to the litigants before the court, which itself
embodies a doctrine of retroactivity.313
As a result, the Blackstonian view-outmoded and artificial as it
may now seem 4-may in many circumstances be more compatible
than the Austinian view with values of stability that underlie our
judicial system, such as the rule of law and stare decisis. Professor
Mishkin has written that the declaratory theory embodies a
"symbolic" idea that the impartiality of courts derives in large part
from the concept that judges have no personal agenda or individual
choice, but are bound by a fixed body of law that is simply there to
be found. While Professor Mishkin acknowledges that this may be a
"myth," he stresses that it is one which underpins the legitimacy of
the judicial system and therefore one by which we abide.315
The values that underlie Professor Mishkin's "symbolic
theory"--values that are certainly essential to the functioning of the
judiciary in our view of American society-may not, as a general rule,
be well served by nonretroactive application of judicial
decisions.316 At the same time, true retroactivity of judicial
decisions could never be the rule. Since according to Blackstone, the
existence of an overruling decision meant that the overruled decision
was never law and was a mistake, true retroactivity would require
that even final decisions could be reopened to substitute what was
"always" law for what was "never" law. But no one advocates that
313. See Kuhm v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years."); Mishkin, supra
note 298, at 60.
314. Accord Richard Fallon, Jr. & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L REv. 1731, 1759-60 (1991).
315. Mishldn, supra note 298, at 62-63. Professor Mishidn explained:
IT]he declaratory theory expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial process on which
much of courts' prestige and power depend. This is the strongly held and deeply felt
belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law
impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise no individual choice and have no
program of their own to advance.... [Tihis symbolic view of courts is a major factor in
securing respect for and obedience to judicial decisions. If the view be in part myth, it is
myth by which we live and which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost.
Id.; see Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907, 931 (1962) (developing an approach similar to Mishkin).
316. Mishkin, supra note 298, at 64-66.
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extreme view, because finality is highly valued in our system, and
courts would be paralyzed if they had to relitigate every final
judgment that might be changed by a new judicial decision.317
The unacceptability of true retroactivity for the above-mentioned
reasons only means that another important value, finality, may
compete with the values underlying retroactive decisionmaking. But
once it is determined that one value is important enough to compete
in that manner, there becomes the possibility that other values might
be sufficiently important as well. For example, protection of reliance
interests is a strong value that in certain circumstances might be
deemed important enough to warrant deviation from the normal
retroactive application of judicial decisions. 8 Once a statute is
settled by judicial construction, retroactive application of a decision
undoing this settled construction can "clog business transactions
[and] unsettle titles."3 19 Persons having dealings in commerce and
property need stability and standards on which they can rely; thus, it
is important to uphold reliance interests in this context.320 Staunch
Blackstone adherents have also subscribed to this view.321 It is
undoubtedly in recognition of such other values that even advocates
of the declaratory theory are willing to accept some prospective
application of new decisions. Perhaps they must, because in some
contexts, retroactive application of a judicial decision may even be
violative of the Constitution.
322
Thus, in the real world, judicial decisions are applied on a
nonretroactive basis from some point-at the least because true
317. Thus, although parties concluded by a final judgment have attempted to use the
Blackstonian view as a means of relitigation, the Court has rejected the effort on the ground of res
judicata. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
318. See, e.g., Walter Schaefer, The Control of 'Sunbursts' Techniques of Prospective
Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L REv. 631 (1967); Orville Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling
Decisions, 35 It.L. L. REV. 121, 146-52 (1940).
319. Farrior v. New England Mortgage Soc'y Corp., 9 So. 532, 533 (Ala. 1891).
320. Charles Torcia and Donald King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional
Concepts, 66 DicK. L RLv. 269,291 (1962); Currier, supra note 301, at 225,235-36,242; Mishkin,
supra note 298, at 70-71 & n.47.
321. Robert von Moschsizker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L. REv. 409,
422 (1924); Currier, supra note 301, at 215-16.
322. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). In criminal cases,
retroactive application of a judicial decision that enlarges the scope of a statute may also violate the
Due Process Clause. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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retroactivity is impossible, and undoubtedly in recognition of other
values as well. The question that must face even the most ardent
Blackstonian adherent is what that point should be.
B. The Prospective Nature of Legislation
While it is the general norm of judges to adjudicate retroactively,
it is the general norm of legislators to legislate prospectively. This
was the case through Greek and Roman law."z Blackstone wrote
that because subjects must be made aware of the consequences of
their actions, "[a]ll laws should.., be made to commence infuturo,
and be notified before their commencement.... ,324 Legislation is
addressed to the future, not to the past, and is not generally drawn so
as to upset people's settled expectations 325 This has been
characterized as a rule of "obvious justice,"3 26 and as a means of
furthering predictability, reliance, and fairness. 327 As an early
American scholar wrote, "[r]etrospective legislation.., is commonly
objectionable in principle and apt to result in injustice.... 328
As a result, "words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective
operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no
other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the
legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied."329 This is especially the
case with statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities, which
are presumed to have only prospective effect.330 It is generally
323. See, e.g., Roger Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question Of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HAsT. LJ. 533, 533 (1977).
324. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 298, *46; accord THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
CONSTTuTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 92, 156. See generally Elmer Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive
Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MmIN. L REV. 775 (1936).
325.. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 161 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v.
C.I.R., 323 U.S. 141, 163 (1944).
326. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); accord
Cooley, supra note 324, 62 (1868).
327. Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
328. T. Cooley, supra note 324, 62-63.
329. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); see also
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314
(1908); United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 399, 413 (1806) (Paterson, J.).
330. Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985); see Union Pacific Railway Co., 231
U.S. at 199.
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accepted that statutes will not be applied retroactively to deprive a
party of rights that actually have vested.33
"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while
judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law
student."332 This difference in approach is not problematic so long
as the two branches of government perform their primary
functions-when the legislature legislates, and the judiciary
adjudicates. But which branch's approach to retroactivity should be
used if the judiciary legislates?
C. The Proper Treatment of Judicial Legislation
If a court makes law as a legislature would, it should be able to
apply that "made" law as a legislature would. In situations where
retroactive application of newly made law creates injustice and upsets
settled expectations, it may be fairer and more just to apply the newly
made law prospectively as a legislature would. This approach would
not only be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it would also
fulfill goals established by such precedent.
1. The Nature of Judicial Legislation
The realization that the judiciary must sometimes legislate does
not necessarily conjure up sometimes-criticized notions of "judicial
activism." Rather, courts may legislate to fill gaps in statutory
law.333 The Supreme Court has used the term "interstitial federal
lawmaking" to describe the function of judicial legislation to fill
statutory gaps.334 The evolution of judge-made "federal common
331. See, e.g., Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Insular Collector of Customs, 297 U.S. 666 (1936);
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Conm'rs, 258 U.S.
338 (1922); Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913).
332. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982).
333. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, supra note 301, 141.
334. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (quoting Paul
Mishkin, The Variousness of 'Federal Law: Competence and Discretion in the Choice and National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L REv. 797,800 (1957)); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392,395 (1946); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,268 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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law" in areas of federal legislation where Congress has not spoken
explicitly on a particular topic owes its existence to judicial
lawmaking. 33 A court may also legislate when Congress has
passed a clearly incomplete statute, and the court determines that it
should not adjudicate a particular case or class of cases under such a
336statute without filling in the gap.
The Court has rendered many significant decisions involving
"interstitial federal lawmaking," including decisions under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act.337 In fact, judicial interstitial legislation
is as old as the American judicial system, and was probably more
prevalent long ago because there were fewer laws, and, hence, more
interstices. 338 Not only is Congress aware that the federal courts
engage in judicial legislation, it may even ratify such legislation.339
Despite its interstitial lawmaking power, the judiciary is not a
legislature, nor is it representative of or directly responsive to the
populace as a whole. Congress, by contrast, is the nation's supreme
lawmaking body, and is directly accountable to the electorate.
Furthermore, the deliberative, policy-oriented nature of the legislative
process and the popular election of legislators makes Congress much
better equipped than the judiciary to handle the task of broad-
spectrum legislation.'
335. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973); see Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Mishkin, supra note 334, at 800; Henry
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 409-11
(1964).
336. Lampf is an example of this approach. See also, e.g., B. CARDOZO, supra note 301,113-
15.
337. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (requiring
preponderance of evidence standard of proof); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(implementing scienter requirement); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(limiting standing to purchasers or sellers of securities).
338. "Judges legislate interstitially and the interstices were great in [Chief Justice] Marshall's
time." FRaEmucK RmBnL, STATE AND NATIONAL PowE OvER COMMERCE 47 (1937) (quoted in
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413 n.8 (1946)); see also Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
339. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753,2764 (June 26, 1992).
340. As Professor Moore has written:
The legislative process involves public discussion and a vote by the people's
representatives, and is calculated to expose the views of a spectrum of persons who may
be affected by changes in the law. The judicial process, by contrast, operates through
considerations of disputes between litigants, with very limited provision for considering
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Thus, it is inappropriate to assume that every manner of a federal
court's operations when it interprets the Constitution may be
mechanically transplanted to situations in which the court behaves
more like an unelected nine-person legislature.
Lampfis a decision of judicial lawmaking. The decision may be
considered to have been useful lawmaking because federal courts
were forced to decide the limitations period for section 10(b) actions,
due to congressional silence. 1 But whatever the Court's motives,
Lampf is still a decision of judicial legislation. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that any statute of limitations is a creature
of policy-making and legislation2
Judicial legislation is not of itself a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. The three branches of government can commingle
their functions to a limited extent, as long as the commingling does
not interfere with the accomplishment of the branches'
constitutionally assigned functions and does not threaten the
constitutionally delegated authority of another branch.343 In fact,
the power to create federal common law through judicial legislation
other points of view.
1B J. Moomn, supra note 204, 0A0213.-1] at 47; accord Henry Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L RLv. 489,493 (1954); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
312-13 (1981).
341. It also may not have been an example of judicial lawmaking. The Court could easily have
maintained its prior practice of state-borrowing absent congressional action, the course of action
Justice Stevens advocated. Lampf et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2784-85 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). It also had the other legislative options of borrowing another federal statute of limitations,
or declaring that a single state limitations period would become the uniform limitations period for
the federal action. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); see supra notes 105, 130 and
accompanying text.
342. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). The Court explained:
[Statutes of limitations] are by definition arbitrary, and ... have come into the law not
through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about
the privilege to litigate.... ]he history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good
only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control.
Id,. see also Johnson, supra note 109, at 910.
343. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425,442-43 (1977); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); cf., e.g.,
Michaelsonv. United States, 266 U.S. 42,65-66 (1924) (discussing interaction between Congress and
courts with respect to punishment of contempt); Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1, 45-47
(1825) (discussing interaction between Congress and the courts with respect to execution of
judgments).
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in areas where Congress has legislated incompletely is considered to
be a necessary incident of "effective Constitutionalism."'
But when a federal court engages in judicial lawmaking, whether
through interstitial legislation or otherwise, it moves from the
Blackstonian role of finding law345 to the Austinian role of making
it.346 It is thus acting as a legislature, 347 and its "made" law
344. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,593 (1983) (quoting Mishkin,
supra note 334, at 800).
345. It may sometimes be attempting to declare new governing law in an area based on what
it perceives Congressional intent to be as to an overall program, and to fit its new legislation into that
program. See Mishkin, supra note 334, at 800. But this is not a "declaration" or "interpretation" of
existing law. It is instead an action that involves the weighing of competing policies-which is, in
its purest form, legislation. See Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 865 (1986).
346. B. CARDOZO, supra note 301, 113-15. Justice Cardozo wrote:
Each [judge and legislator] is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt
the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open
spaces in the law.... [Within the confines of those open spaces and those of precedent
and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law
which is the resulting product is not found, but made. The process, being legislative,
demands the legislator's wisdom.
Id.
While perhaps courts should confine their legislation to the interstices of federal law, they of
course extend their lawmaking beyond these bounds at times. Thus, in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S.
267 (1951), the Court held for the first time that a trustee could be surcharged for the profits made
by two of his assistants through insider trading related to their duties as trustee, even if his actions
were merely negligent. It did not, however, cite a single case or statute for this proposition. Justice
Black, dissenting, thought that "there [was] much to be said in favor of such a rule for cases arising
in the future," but that since it did not exist until the Supreme Court created it, applying it
retroactively to Mr. Darrow was "grossly unfair." Id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
347. In constitutional adjudication, where the Court is expounding on matters that affect the
framework of our society, a newly declared constitutional principle may so implicate existing shared
values that it might be considered the declaration of a preexisting law. See Mishkin, supra note 298,
at 60. But even this method of applying Blackstone to new constitutional interpretations cannot be
transplanted mechanically to pure interstitial judicial legislation. It can hardly be said that the Court's
creation of a § 10(b) limitations period is a "clear implication of values ... generally shared in
society." (Indeed, since it is a norm of our legal system that there should be redress for injuries, see,
e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 298, *23, *109 (quoted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803)), Lampf would appear to have precisely the opposite effect.)
The term "interstitial judicial lawmaking" has been applied to issues in private civil actions
going to the remedy or bar thereof. See DelCostello v. International Brd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983) (limitations period in employee's federal labor action against employer and union); Reed v.
United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989) (limitations period in employee's federal labor
action against union); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)
(limitations period in civil RICO action); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580
(1973) (application of federal land acquisition agreement over state prescriptive period); Homberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (limitations period in action by creditors of federal land bank to
impose federal statutory liability on shareholders). None of these matters rises to the level of shared
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should be susceptible to application in the same manner that a
legislature's would.
Even if theories based on courts finding law have general
application, they cannot be applied literally to judicial legislation. It
would be the most fictional of judicial fictions to argue that when a
federal court creates a new law, it is actually finding a law that until
then did not exist but was waiting to be created and then found as
soon as someone created it. It would hardly befit the Court, a body
that so much relies on the legitimacy and evenhandedness of its
processes, to base a method of making decisions on such a concocted
rationale. The inapplicability of the "declaratory theory" to a
legislative paradigm should not be ignored for the sake of orthodox
adherence to Blackstonian dogma. The law, after all, does not favor
literalistic interpretations that create absurd or unreasonable
results.
349
If the Blackstonian approach cannot rationally be applied to
judicial legislation, it makes more sense to apply an Austinian
approach. When a court makes law, for whatever reason, it is acting
as a legislature would. Thus, its actions should be applied in the same
manner as would those of a legislature. Since legislatures legislate
prospectively, the judiciary should consider itself empowered to do
the same.
Moreover, as will be shown, such an approach is consistent with
the views of Justice Harlan that have now been adopted by the
Supreme Court. It is in fact the only approach to judicial legislation
that achieves the goals of equality and fairness that have been set
forth as the cornerstones of those views.
societal values that might be found by a court that is declaring a new principle of constitutional law.
Thus, irrespective of the validity or applicability of the view that even newly declared constitutional
principles are found law and not made law, that view has no effect on an analysis of judicial
interstitial lawmaking.
348. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932) (Frankfurter, L,
concurring).
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2. Prospectivity and Judicial Legislation
Justice Harlan's dissent in Mackey, and, thus, the current Court's
opinion in Griffith, reflected a generalized view that automatic
retroactivity of decisions is a requirement of federalism inherent in
the judicial power of the federal courts." According to this view,
retroactivity of decisions is necessary because courts are supposed to
apply the law, without weighing policy or otherwise acting like
legislatures. Such reasoning, however, no longer applies when courts
do weigh policy or otherwise act like legislatures. If automatic
retroactivity is used as a means of avoiding judicial legislation, then
it serves no purpose when a court chooses to engage in the judicial
legislation that the automatic retroactivity was supposed to prevent.
The first reason Justice Harlan advocated automatic retroactivity
of new decisions, as set forth in Griffith, was that automatic
retroactivity served the important value of treating similarly situated
litigants the same, unless there is a principled reason for doing
otherwise."' All litigants with pending cases may be similarly
situated and should be treated the same when a court finds a rule of
law that was always there. But it is quite another thing to say that is
the case when the Court is creating, not finding, law. Judge-made law
is exactly that-it is made (legislated), not found. When the judiciary
legislates, it creates at least two categories of litigants: Those whose
cases existed at the time of the legislation, and those whose cases did
not exist at the time of the legislation. 5
Thus, while it is important to the rule of law that similarly
situated parties should be treated similarly unless there is a principled
reason for doing otherwise, that merely begs the question: What are
similarly situated parties, and what is a principled reason for doing
otherwise? Parties whose cases postdate judicial legislation may not
be at all similarly situated to those whose cases precede it, and even
380
349. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678-79 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
350. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987).
351. This, of course, does not preclude the judiciary from creating other categories of litigants
through judicial legislation as well.
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if they were, there is often ample principled reason to treat them
differently.352
Indeed, an inflexible judiciary that professes to be unable to
differentiate between parties whose cases postdate judicial legislation
and those whose cases predate it may find itself rendering decisions
that arbitrarily deprive parties of rights protected by the
Constitution.353 The judiciary may also wreak consequences that,
as a practical matter, devastate the affairs of a substantial number of
private parties or public entities and subject them to tremendous
uncertainty or costly and time-consuming litigation.354 The
judiciary should be positioned to avoid such grave consequences, not
consider itself duty-bound to create them.
Perhaps for such reasons, a majority of the current Supreme Court
would apparently agree with the proposition that a flexible
application of equitable remedies can be used to avoid harsh or
unexpected consequences. 355 However, it is often very difficult to
distinguish between the application of law and the making of
law.356 As a result, it may be difficult to distinguish prospective
352. Currier, supra note 301, at 237; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111
S. CL 2439, 2443 (June 20, 1991) (opinion of Souter, J.) (noting problems with retroactivity in this
context).
Automatic retroactivity also does not treat litigants the same. It involves an effectively arbitrary
distinction between those whose cases have been decided and those whose have not-a distinction
that can be all the more arbitrary because of the lack of predictability of how quickly a case can
move through the system. This arbitrary distinction is made to promote the value of finality, but it
is difficult to see why the value of finality is of paramount importance while that of protecting
reliance interests is of far lesser importance-Le., why this line is a proper one to draw and that
involved in prospective overruling is not. Moreover, the arbitrary distinctions of automatic
retroactivity may also have negative consequences to the rule of law as well as positive ones.
Beytagh, supra note 289, at 1601; Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 63-65 & 64 n.1 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting); Schaefer, supra note 318, at 645.
The foregoing demonstrates at least two things: (1) If a distinction is going to be made for good
reason between those whose cases are final and those whose cases are not, then distinctions that have
other good reasons-including distinctions between pre-legislation and post-legislation litigants that
might support prospective overruling-should be made as well, and (2) no distinction needs to be
perfect. Accord Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
353. See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
354. See Kocourek & Koven, supra note 219, at 972.
355. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (opinion of Souter, J.); id. 2451-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 314,passim; Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 105 HARv.
L REV. 177, 348 (1991).
356. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 314, at 1762-63.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
application of an equitable remedy from prospective application of
a judicially legislated principle of law.3" This distinction is
particularly difficult because the nature of judicial legislation is in
part one of "fashioning remedial details where Congress has not
spoken."
358
The second prong of Justice Harlan's approach, as set forth in
Griffith, was a fairness concept, that anything other than full
retroactivity of judicial decisions allows the judiciary to "restructure
artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant
law."359 However, this concept can have no applicability in cases
involving judicial legislation. A judiciary acting as legislature that
insists on applying its legislation to those who have relied on
previously existing law itself restructures those expectations.
Moreover, no benefit to norms of stability and stare decisis is
promulgated by visiting such harsh treatment on those who had
expectations legitimately created by existing law. Whether a piece of
judicial legislation is applied retroactively or prospectively, it will
still change the law at some point; the only question is when. If legal
change occurs under both approaches, but fairness to those who
relied on an old law exists under only one, our conceptions of the
judicial power do not require adherence to the unfair approach.3 °
For such reasons, it is usually nonretroactive application of a new
law, rather than retroactive application, that is invoked to avoid
restructuring legitimate expectations. As the Supreme Court held in
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,361 vested
357. Cf., e.g., Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88-89 (1982)
(decision holding that bankruptcy court could not constitutionally hear breach of contract suit by
debtor applied prospectively and stayed for limited duration to give Congress the opportunity to
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (although selection of
members of Federal Election Commission held to be unconstitutional, past acts of Commission
accorded de facto validity and decision stayed for 30 days to give Congress the opportunity to
reconstitute the Commission without interfering with enforcement of election laws); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (leaving to lower courts discretion to determine speed at which
Brown decision would be implemented, based on considerations of traditional equitable principles,
adequacy of desegregation plans and difficulty of administration of decree).
358. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1987).
359. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Mackeyv. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
680 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
360. Accord Kocourek & Koven, supra note 219, at 996.
361. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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rights and reliance on past decisions are also important values, and
should in some circumstances compete with or prevail over fixed
concepts of automatic retroactivity. 62
Automatic retroactivity in cases of judicial legislation does not
uphold the rule of law in the manner sought by Justice Harlan,
because there is no "rule of law" to be upheld when the judiciary
creates a new law. In that sense, judicial legislation is unique in the
field of adjudication. While a court that interprets an existing statute
may be working with an existing law that is partly unclear in its
meaning or that has had some prior interpretation, a court that
engages in judicial legislation is setting forth a law for the first time.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere--"to adhere to pre-
cedents and not to unsettle things which are established" 363-may
be an important value of stability in our judicial system, but it can
hardly apply when the judiciary decides to eschew established
precedent (if there is any) and instead to create new law.
If the judiciary has the power to create new law, it also must have
the power to decide how that new law is going to be applied.3 4
Furthermore, the judiciary should not hesitate to exercise that power
362. Id at 374. The Court stated:
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration .... Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, or prior determination deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
and of its previous application, demand examination. IThus], it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be sustained.
Id; see Kocourek & Koven, supra note 219, at 972; Schaefer, supra note 318, at 646.
363. See, e.g., Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 330 (Tex. Ct. Crm. App. 1992) (Baird, J.,
dissenting).
364. In implementing the new limitations period set forth in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985), some courts held that an action would not be time-barred if it was filed within the shorter
of (1) the state personal injury limitations period (the requirement of Wilson) computed from the time
of the Wilson decision, or (2) the limitations period of the forum previously used for § 1983 claims,
computed from the time of the alleged wrong. Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556,559-60 (9th Cir.
1987); Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1986). This is much like an approach to
similar questions previously used by the Supreme Court, which was to hold that a new statutory
limitations period would commence running no earlier than the time it was enacted, even as to
pending actions, since it could not be applied retrospectively to bar an action that was timely when
filed. See United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1926); Union
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Iaramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190,200-01 (1913); Herrick v. Boquillas Land
& Cattle Co., 200 U.S. 96, 102 (1906); Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 596,599 (1873); Ross
v. Duval, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 45, 62 (1839).
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in appropriate situations. If courts deny themselves the ability of a
legislature to consider legitimate expectations and other policy issues,
the automatic application of an inflexible rule to a situation that
demands flexibility could itself create the very harm of restructuring
expectations against which Justice Harlan sought to guard. If a court
chooses to make policy decisions and truly new law, and visits the
consequences of those choices on the populace, it may become the
"super-legislature" Justice Harlan condemned, without the
rudimentary safeguard of notice of legislative enactments used
universally by democratic lawmaking bodies.
This is not to say that a judiciary-acting-as-legislature should
automatically apply all of its decisions prospectively only. Not even
Congress, a body for which prospectivity is the norm, has a hard and
fast rule that all of its legislation will be applied prospectively. 65
When the federal judiciary acts like a legislature, it only does so in
the context of adjudicating a "case or controversy"-its consti-
tutionally prescribed task under Article M.3" This limit suggests
that whatever prospectivity rules the judiciary adopts should be
tailored to that branch's constitutionally mandated function of
adjudication. Prospective judicial decisionmaking is still only a
means toward the end of adjudicating disputes, and it should thus be
applied in a manner that promotes the end of appropriate dispute
resolution.
As discussed above, the norm for legislatures is to apply statutes
on a prospective basis.367 However, since the judiciary is a different
institution with different processes, rules governing congressional
legislation cannot automatically be applied to federal courts'
legislation. If federal courts adopted a rule that judicial legislation
would be applied only on a prospective basis, newly created laws
could never be applied to the parties before the court in the case
where the new principle was pronounced. This scenario would give
parties before the court little incentive to frame issues in an
365. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
366. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
367. See supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
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adversarial manner which might assist the court in determining
whether to create a new rule of law. 68
Federal courts work best when issues are presented to them in an
adversarial context.369 In order to ensure that this occurs, there must
be, at least, a possibility that the court can resolve an issue in a
manner that affects the parties before it. The result is that the parties
before the court must be able to litigate not only the underlying
substantive issue-whether the judiciary should legislate any new law,
and if so, which one-but also the retroactivity of the new rule if one
is created. It is, of course, part of the "case or controversy"
requirement that a federal court must have before it adverse parties
whose disputes and adverse contentions are being submitted to the
court for adjudication.370 But as long as both the underlying rule of
law and its retroactivity vel non are part of an adversarially litigated
"case or controversy," the federal court can certainly state that: (1) A
new rule will generally be the most appropriate way to decide the
class of cases of controversies that includes the case at bar, but (2) for
reasons of fairness and equity, principles of stare decisis will be
applied to the parties before it.
371
This approach does not detract from the adversarial nature of the
presentation on which a federal court naturally relies to discharge its
duties. This is because neither party before the court knows at the
time it presents its case whether (1) a new rule of law will be
adopted, or (2) if it is, whether it will be applied retroactively. The
party seeking to benefit from a change in law will also be able to
argue the retroactivity of the new law it is seeking. The party wishing
to retain the status quo will argue both against the new law and, if
adopted, against having it applied retroactively. Even if part of the
court's ultimate opinion ends up being only a guide to the future, part
368. Eg., Mishldn, supra note 298, at 61; von Moschsizker, supra note 321, at 426; Note,
supra note 315, at 1412.
369. This is how federal courts work best, and how they are expected to work. See, e.g., Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 n.16 (1976) (stating that federal court
standing is in part based on "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult... questions").
370. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911).
371. See, e.g., Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,213-14 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395
U.S. 701, 706 (1969); New York State Bar Association Address, supra note 224, 294-96.
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of it-at the very least, the part that decides whether a new rule will
be applied retroactively-will be an integral part of the court's
adjudication of the case before it. More importantly, the opinion
comes within the framework-of an adversely presented case, 372
which is what a federal court needs to fulfill its constitutional
function.
373
Thus, a federal court has the power to say that a given rule is
wrong, and that a different rule will be applied to future cases, but not
372. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1964)
(declining to apply the holding to the litigants in the case because of reasonableness of their view
of prior precedent, and because dismissal would have deprived them of a remedy).
373. See Currier, supra note 301, at 217-18; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 314, at 1801 & nn.
384-86.
The view has been advanced that full retroactivity emanates from the "case and controversy"
requirement of Article l11-that to apply decisions on a prospective basis requires writing an opinion
that has nothing to do with the actual decision of a case on the merits. See Currier, supra note 301,
at 216, and authorities cited therein. That view, however, does not withstand scrutiny, for reasons
such as those set forth herein.
A more refined analysis might be that Article I1 embodies an approach which restrains judges
from disturbing or denying the validity of statutes or actions of other branches of government unless
there is a necessity for doing so. This approach discourages courts from making changes in the law
when legislatures can; see Note, supra note 315, at 931-32. But it appears to be derived more from
stare decisis and perceptions of the "judicial power" than from anything in the "case or controversy"
requirement per se. Beyond that, judges do sometimes make changes in the law, but there is nothing
inherently wrong with that practice, and it does have moderating influences. See infra note 380 and
accompanying text. Legislatures do not always make changes in the law when they can, and in fact
they are often slow to act, which may have the effect of moving the judiciary toward legislation, as
is evidenced by the development of judicial law on § 10(b) actions. Finally, whatever the validity of
that approach, it appears to be more an analysis of whether a law should be changed in the frst
place, rather than a norm of constitutional empowerment governing the question of whether a new
law will be applied prospectively or retroactively. See infra note 379 and accompanying text.
A federal court's only constitutional command is to adjudicate disputes in its exercise of the
"judicial power," which requires that it apply its knowledge of the law to the facts of particular cases.
But the Constitution does not prescribe how, or whether, a federal court will give notice of its view
of the law that it will use for future decisions. Generally, a court gives such notice by issuing written
opinions inwhich it sets forth the principles it perceives to govern a given case, and that it expects
to use in similar future cases. That approach helps to maintain stability in the legal system and to
minimize wholly ad hoc decisionmaking. But it is only incidental to our system of government. See
von Moschsizker, supra note 321, at 423. Nothing in Article MI1 specifies what methods the Court
must use in establishing new principles or how those new principles are to be used, and nothing in
Article II requires that the Court even issue written opinions in every (or any) case. It is simply not
plausible to conclude that Article III is violated when a written opinion is issued that happens to
contain material inserted for guidance to future courts-which itself promotes stability by preventing
unnecessary litigation and uncertainty over matters the court considers settled. A fuller analysis of
the constitutional arguments on retroactivity may be found in Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 314, at
1799-807.
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to past cases or the present case. The court's pronouncement of the
law by which it intends to abide in the future may technically be no
more than dictum; however, dictum is an important part of the
method by which federal courts shape the evolution of the law. 74
Indeed, if courts were to ignore dictum, great constitutional decisions
such as Marbury v. Madison might be little more than mere footnotes
to history.375 It is not uncommon for courts to set forth important
principles of constitutional law in cases where they cannot or will not
be applied to the litigants at bar, as is further evidenced by modern
Supreme Court doctrines and practices such as "harmless error,"
"capable of repetition yet evading review," and the discussion of
alternative grounds of a decision.
3 76
In some circumstances, this approach might make judicial legis-
lation more acceptable by limiting the reach of the legislation.377
For example, it is quite possible that the nonretroactive application
of the Warren Court's new rules of criminal procedure was precisely
what made these new rules possible. 7 Nonetheless, the idea that
the courts should apply judicial legislation prospectively is not a
command that courts should legislate, and judicial legislation should
374. See 1B J. MooRF, supra note 204, 0.402[2] at 44-45 & n.59. There is often little
agreement on what actually is dictum and what is holding. Id. 0.402[2] at 28 & n.8.
375. Beytagh, supra note 289, at 1615 ("If dictum was acceptable in Marbury, consistent with
Article Iil, then it is allowable afortiori in... far less momentous circumstances .... "); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 314,
at 1800-01. Interestingly, Justice Harlan cited Marbury for the proposition that the Supreme Court
"is entitled to decide constitutional issues only when the facts of a particular case require their
resolution for a just adjudication on the merits.- Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, I., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
376. Fallon &Meltzer, supra note 314, at 1799-801 & n.380. As another example, in Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court held for the first time that due process required
a parolee to be given a hearing with certain fundamental safeguards before his parole could be
revoked. However, it did so based on an inadequate record on which the possibility existed that the
petitioners had admitted parole violations, and that such admissions were sufficient for revocation
under state standards. Id. at 477, 490. The decision was thus used as an opportunity to promulgate
new constitutional guidelines for parole revocation that may or may not have had any effect on the
petitioners, and that indeed were not part of a fully defined case.
In earlier times, the Supreme Court was not reluctant to set forth its views on broad areas of
constitutional law, without being constrained in its expositions by the facts of a particular case. These
are the opinions on which much of our tradition of constitutional law is based. See Ribble, supra note
338, 47-48.
377. Note, supra note 306, at 1412.
378. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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not be applied inappropriately merely because it exists. If the
particular legislation is desirable, it should be applied as fairly as
possible. If the legislation is undesirable, that is the problem to be
addressed, and the question of how fair the application of the legis-
lation will be is only a byproduct of the legislation.379 Two wrongs
do not make a right, and there is no sense in a rule that says, "Judicial
legislation should not exist, but since we have decided to enact it
here, we are going to apply it unfairly and wrongly because we really
don't like the idea of it."
In any event, there is something inherently unusual about
attempting to limit a perceived harm (judicial legislation) by ensuring
that it will be as harsh and unfairly applied as possible if enacted.
This approach becomes more unusual when it is recognized, as
discussed herein, that there is nothingper se wrong with the practice.
And in cases such as Lampf, the courts may not be dissuaded from
legislating by the harshness and unfairness of automatic
retroactivity-they may just end up with judicial legislation applied
harshly and unfairly.
Moreover, the spectre of a judiciary run amok with judicial
legislation has not materialized after well over a century of
prospective overruling. Nor is it likely to do so in the future. If
nothing else, courts have an institutional stake in taking actions that
maximize respect for the judicial process, and lawless courts that do
not adhere to sound principles governing the performance of judicial
functions will not succeed in doing so. Federal judges are not
unaware of or unconcerned with their role as a coequal part of the
"checks and balances" of our federal system.
In addition, it would be expected that on the whole, federal judges
would act to promote their branch as a strong, stable and well-
functioning institution. Courts promote themselves by following
time-honored norms of adjudication as strong general rules to further
stability and fairness, but not absolutes when the general rules stand
in the way of desired judicial ends. For example, as Justice Jackson
once remarked, the stability-enhancing doctrine of stare decisis is not
379. Accord Beytagh, supra note 289, at 1607; Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 62 (1985)
(White, L, dissenting).
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a mechanical doctrine that blocks any judicial change; it is simply a
presumption that helps ensure that judicial change is reasoned and
moderate, which is what makes such change acceptable."'
Of course, if the federal courts do run amok with wholly
inappropriate legislation, Congress retains the power to nullify these
judicial pronouncements."' It should not be expected that courts
will suddenly turn lawless with judicial legislation if they are
empowered to overrule prospectively in narrowly limited but well
defined situations. More likely, a deep sense of judicial tradition and
respect for the institution will continue to counsel that change be
moderate and justifiable if there is to be change at all. Any change
that does occur, however, should not be applied unfairly as a means
of deterring future change.
The import of this is clear: When the judiciary interprets an
existing law, either by statutory interpretation or application of
principles of constitutional law, it is finding law and may apply its
decisions retroactively. But when the judiciary creates law, it is
acting as a legislature. In such circumstances, the ordinary canons of
judicial decisionmaking may not apply, and the correct approach may
well be that of the legislature that the judiciary is emulating.
Congress applies its legislation in futuro as a means of promoting
stability and fairness, and the courts should consider doing the
same.
38 2
380. Jackson, J., Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. L 334, 334 (1944). Justice
Jackson explained:
I never have, and I think few lawyers ever have, regarded [stare decisis] as an absolute.
... We cannot deny to the judicial process capacity for improvement, adaptation, and
alteration unless we are prepared to leave all evolution and progress in the law to
legislative processes. But... [u]nless the assumption is substantially true that cases will
be disposed of by application of known principles and previously disclosed courses of
reasoning, our common-law system would become the most intolerable kind of ex post
facto judicial law-making. Moderation in change is all that makes judicial participation
in the evolution of law tolerable.
Id; see also 1B J. MooRp, supra note 204, 0.402[1] at 24 (stating that stare decisis and the rule
of law are norms of our judicial system, but of sound judicial practice rather than
empowerment).
381. See infra notes 403-404 and accompanying text.
382. This would also seem to follow logically from the premise that "[p]rospective overruling
is equated with legislation" Mishkin, supra note 298, at 65.
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3. Criteria for Prospective Application of Judicial
Legislation
As stated above, Congress's legislation is usually prospective
because it furthers predictability, reliance and fairness to legislate in
a way that does not upset people's settled expectations."' Since
both "statutory [and] judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which
people must rely in making decisions and shaping their conduct,"384
federal courts should apply similar criteria. For example, as discussed
above, judicial legislation should be applied prospectively when to do
otherwise would create an injustice or interfere with parties' settled
expectations or reliance interests, or if the consequences of full retro-
activity of a judicial decision would be devastating. 38
This analysis also holds true on the issue of statutes of
limitations. A decision that lengthens an existing statute of
limitations may be applied retroactively because it does not create an
injustice or undo reliance interests. A defendant may be disappointed
that it did not get to interpose a defense, but it has no particular
expectation or vested right in the longer period.386 Also, if the rule
in question is not truly new judicial legislation, but merely "codifies"
existing judicial practice, there is no legitimate interest that would be
upset by retroactive application of the new rule. By contrast, a
decision that is truly new and shortens existing statutes of limitations
would be the type of decision that could be applied nonretro-
actively.387 It should also be considered, however, that not even
Congressional legislation is always applied prospectively. 88 If the
383. See supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
384. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973).
385. See supra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
386. Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243
(1976); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620
(1885); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989).
387. Even though one purpose behind the prospectivity of congressional legislation is to protect
reliance interests, congressional legislation operates prospectively on a class-wide basis. It does not
require members of the class to show individualized reliance on law that may be superseded in order
to avoid retroactive application of a statute. Judicial legislation should thus be applied in tho samo
manner.
388. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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nature of a statutory scheme is clearly such that retroactive
application would most further the will of Congress, then a court
should apply Congress's legislation retroactively, unless that would
violate some other constitutional provision."'
The above analysis suggests that a court should consider three
criteria in determining whether to apply a new rule of law
retroactively: (1) Has a court legislated a rule of law that actually is
new?; (2) Would prospective application of the rule interfere with the
operation of a legislative program or statutory scheme?; (3) Would
retroactive application of the rule create injustice or interfere with
vested rights?
This approach is not exactly novel. Rather, it is simply the
Chevron Oil approach applied specifically to judicial legislation.3
Retaining Chevron Oil for cases that involve judicial legislation
allows a federal court to proclaim allegiance to the declaratory
theory39' if that is its preferred approach to decisionmaking, yet
allows it to treat its own legislation as exactly what it is. Further, this
approach serves to adapt principles of legislative prospectivity to the
federal courts. Under a legislative paradigm, prospective and not
retrospective operation of law-as the Supreme Court put it, the
principle of "obvious justice"-is what generally furthers stability and
equality of treatment. 39 Therefore, prospective application of new
law is the approach that should be adopted when judicial legislation
would create unduly harsh results in a manner not approved by
Congress or the Constitution. 93
Justice O'Connor's Lampf dissent demonstrates that applying
Lampfretroactively to bar claims that were timely when filed would
lead to "unprecedented unfairness."M Retroactive operation of the
new Lampf rule may in fact be contrary to the Constitution as
389. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. RA. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,728-31 (1984).
390. See supra notes 237 and accompanying text (setting forth the Chevron Oil approach).
391. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
393. It is not the intent of this Article to focus on all of the possible prospective applications
of judicial decisions. It suffices if the discussion herein demonstrates that there are compelling
reasons not to apply a doctrine of automatic retroactivity in cases of judicial legislation.
394. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2788 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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interpreted in prior Supreme Court decisions.39 Thus, the Chevron
Oil approach counsels prospective application of the Lampfdecision.
In this context, the words of Justice Frankfirter are apropos:
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail
themselves of it waived their rights. It is much more conducive to law's
self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law.
3%
Adoption of the Chevron Oil approach as a means of determining
the retroactivity of the judicial legislation in Lampfwould obviate the
need to determine whether section 27A violated any provision of the
Constitution.397 This approach would thus fulfill the important
judicial policies that constitutional issues should only be reached
when there is no alternative, 39' and that an Act of Congress may
only be declared unconstitutional when there is no construction by
which this can be avoided. 9
395. See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
396. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justices Stevens
and Souter, in dissent in Lampf, also alluded to the difficulties involved with legislating a limitations
period and applying the newly legislated limitations period retroactively:
I believe, however, that Congress, rather than the federal judiciary, has the responsibility
for making the policy determinations that are required in rejecting a rule selected under
the doctrine of state borrowing, long applied in § 10(b) cases, and choosing a new
limitations period and its associated tolling rules.... When the Court ventures into this
lawmaking area ... it inevitably raises questions concerning the retroactivity of its new
rule that are difficult and arguably inconsistent with the neutral, non-policy making role
of the judge. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson; In re Data Access [Systems Securities
Litigation] (Seitz, J., dissenting).
Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2784 (Stevens, J, dissenting). One conclusion that could be drawn from this
citation to Chevron Oil and Judge Seitz's Lampf dissent would be that Chevron Oil is the best
method of analyzing retroactivity when the judiciary does feel compelled to legislate, because
legislation is a matter of policymaklng that may call for prospective application.
397. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
398. Specttor Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
399. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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D. Section 27A: Congress's Prospective Application of Judicial
Legislation
The Supreme Court did not rule and has not yet ruled on the
precise issue of whether Lampfshould be applied retroactively to all
claims pending at the time that decision was announced. It did,
however, apply the new rule in Lampfto the litigants in that case.'
In addition, Beam suggests that a majority of the Court would apply
any new rule of law retroactively when it is applied to the litigants in
the case where the rule is pronounced. °1 It was against this
background, with the Court seemingly prepared to apply the newly
legislated limitations period in Lampf retroactively, that Congress
passed the new section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act.4"
From an analytical standpoint, there are four possible actions that
Congress could take in response to a Supreme Court decision that
enacted legislation: (1) Congress could ratify the Court's legislation
if it agreed with what the Court did, by enacting a statute to the same
effect; (2) Congress could modify the legislation, if it agreed with
what the Court did in part; (3) Congress could nullify the legislation
if the Court erred in interpreting the will of Congress; or (4) Congress
could do nothing, in which case the Court's legislation would
continue in effect.
At first blush, one might question whether Congress has the
constitutional power to modify or nullify a Supreme Court pro-
nouncement. After all, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial
authority in the land, and it does not discharge its judicial functions
in a manner that renders it subservient to Congress.
While that statement is true as far as it goes, it does not address
the issue of what happens when the Supreme Court misinterprets the
will of Congress. It is certainly true that Congress has no power to
ratify, modify or nullify a Supreme Court interpretation of the
Constitution. But nothing prohibits Congress, the supreme legislature,
400. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at2782-83.
401. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448; id. at 2449 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2450-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
402. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1992).
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from taking action in response to a Court decision pertaining to
Congress's legislation. To the contrary, Congress is fully empowered
to overrule or modify an erroneous federal court interpretation of the
intent of Congress, as the Supreme Court has itself acknow-
ledged. 3 This should especially be true when the mistake concerns
what Congress intended, because no body can opine on the intent of
Congress better than Congress itself.
The same principle applies with even greater force if the Court
has enacted legislation. If Congress wishes to ensure that legislation
is made by elected officials and not unelected judges, its wishes in
the legislative area in which it is constitutionally supreme must be
respected. If the Supreme Court errs in its enactment of legislation,
an area where it does not have paramount constitutional authority, it
is up to the body that does have paramount legislative authority to
correct the error. Thus, for example, Congress can pass a new statute
to carry out the intent it originally had in passing an earlier statute,
when in the interim the Supreme Court has erroneously nullified the
intent of the original statute.'
The Lampf decision was not an interpretation of the Consti-
tution.40 5 Nor was it even an attempt to discern what Congress
meant through the words of a statute.' Instead, it appears to have
been an attempt to figure out what Congress would have meant had
403. United States v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 771, 774-75 (1948). The Court
explained:
[Olverruling or modification [of a prior Supreme Court decision interpreting a federal
statute] should be lef to Congress.... [W]hen the questions are of statutory construction,
not of constitutional import, Congress can rectify our mistake, if such it was, or change
its policy at any time....
Id; accord Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,734 n.14 (1977); James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213,233-34 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295,320-21 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Helvering v. Haliock, 309 U.S.
106, 130 (1940) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johnson, supra note 109, at
930-31.
404. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1962); United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,235-36 (1949); United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Ry. Co.,
270 U.S. 1, 4 (1926); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948).
405. The only issue in the Supreme Court's Lampf decision dealt with the limitations period
in Exchange Act § 10(b) actions. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2776 (1991).
406. See Lampf, 111 S.Ct at 2779-80.
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it used words that it did not use, and what it would have done had it
contemplated things that it did not contemplate. 7 If the Court
erred in this somewhat speculative effort, only Congress can set the
record straight.
Lampf, read in conjunction with Beam, would appear to have
combined two different elements of judicial legislation: A legislative
determination of what statute of limitations would be applied in
actions under section 10(b), and a legislative determination of
whether that statute of limitations would be applied retroactively. The
Congressional response, section 27A, addressed both of those
apparent elements of the Court legislation. It acquiesced in the
limitations period (action (1) above), and nullified the retroactive
effect (action (3) above).4°8 This is a rational response of Congress
based on a policy determination that even if the Court's limitations
period is not to be changed, parties who have cases pending before
a federal court still should not have their causes of action
extinguished on technical grounds through no action or inaction of
their own.
This policy determination is not solely a recent congressional
pronouncement. Rather, it emanates from what may be the highest
irony in the Lampfcase: If Lampfhad been an act of Congress instead
of a Supreme Court decision, its retroactive application should have
been rejected by the Court as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that
Congress violates due process by enacting a new statute of limitations
and applying it retroactively, thereby depriving a party arbitrarily of
a right to be heard in court.' A legislature cannot adopt a new,
shortened limitations period without at least providing a reasonable
period in which affected parties may bring their existing claims.4t 0
407. Neither Congress nor the SEC contemplated such a private remedy. See, e.g., Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 729-30 (1975).
408. See supra notes 403-404 and accompanying text.
409. See infra note 410.
410. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).The Court explained:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the court. A statute could
not bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this opportunity; if it should
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But if it is unconstitutional for the legislative branch to implement
legislation that wipes out some existing claims arbitrarily, it is surely
no more constitutional for a nonlegislative branch to implement
legislation that wipes out some existing claims arbitrarily.
4" n
The LampfCourt professed to have legislated its new limitations
period based on how it thought "Congress would have balanced the
policy considerations." 412 But if the Court had truly sought to
follow congressional intent, it would not have looked only to what
limitations period Congress would have legislated had it thought
about it. It also would have looked to whether Congress would have
made such a limitations period retroactive. If the federal judiciary is
going to cite "what Congress would have intended" as a justification
for its own judicial legislation, as it did in Laynpf (and in the other
federal-borrowing limitations cases), 413 it should apply the legis-
attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily ... It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time
after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action.
Id; accord Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190,202 (1913); Ochoa v.
Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 154, 161-62 (1913); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. at 316; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 643
(1884); Terry v. Anderson, 5 Otto (95 U.S.) 628, 632-33 (1877); Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (84
U.S.) 596,598-99 (1873); Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. (56 U.S.) 421,424-25 (1853); see also Smed,
supra note 324, at 781. Professor Smead wrote:
Where [statutes of limitations] are retroactive to the extent that the period of limitations,
within which the case must be brought, has run prior to the enactment of the Acts, they
are equivalent to a destruction of the property right involved. Consequently, such statutes
must either begin to run on actions from the time they are enacted, or leave a reasonable
proportion of the period of limitation unexpired at the date of their enactment. If one of
these two conditions is not observed, the statute of limitations, by destroying the remedy,
destroys the rights back of the remedy without giving a notice or opportunity for a
hearing. They are consequently void as denying due process of law, of which they are
guilty solely because they are retroactive.
Id
411. Beyond the obviousness of this principle, the Supreme Court has suggested that where
access to the courts is necessary to vindicate established rights, there may be due process problems
in denying that right of access arbitrarily or discriminatorily. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422,429-31 & n.5 (1982); see also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co., 281 U.S. 673, 680
(1929) (constitutional requirement of due process extends to state action whether through judicial,
legislative or executive branch; thus, judiciary could not deprive plaintiff of cause of action through
new construction of an otherwise valid statute when this would leave plaintiff with no opportunity
to bring an action to vindicate rights).
412. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991).
413. Id at 2778, 2780; Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987);
DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983).
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lation in the same manner that Congress would have intended to
apply it.
Since the Court declined to do so, Congress was well within its
power to carry out what its intent really was. And Congress's practice
for new statutes of limitations-including statutes of limitations in
other areas of economic legislation-has been to implement them on
a prospective basis, as it would other statutes.
414
Moreover, had the Court looked to congressional intent as to
retroactivity, it could have found a declaration of such intent that was
contemporaneous with the Lampf case itself. Shortly before the
Court's decision in Lampf, Congress set forth an explicit declaration
of legislative intent on the issue of retroactivity of limitations
periods.415 When Congress enacted a catch-all four-year federal
statute of limitations in December 1990, it explicitly made the
limitations period prospective by applying it only to actions created
by Congress after that date.416 Congress did so because it viewed
settling the expectations of parties as an essential purpose of the
statute of limitations, and it did not want to impose a new limitations
period retrospectively because it might threaten to disrupt the settled
expectations of many parties.417 The Lampf Court knew of the
existence of the new four-year statute of limitations, but it relegated
that statute to a footnote,418 and did not analyze the new period in
conjunction with the issue of congressional intent as to retroactivity.
Because the reasoning and intent of Congress is that new
limitations periods should not disrupt the settled expectations of the
parties, and thus should be applied prospectively only, the Court
should have respected the wishes of Congress in this area. The
414. :g., Act July 7, 1955 Pub. L No. § 4,69 Stat. 283 (1955) (new four-year Clayton Act
limitations period to take effect six months after enactment); 7 U.S.C. § 25(d) (1988) (new limitations
period for statutory actions under Commodities Exchange Act not to affect causes of action accruing
prior to date of enactment of statute). This is also a policy that has been imposed on Congress by the
Supreme Court. See Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 596,598-99 (citing United States v. Heth,
& U.S. (3 Cranch) 399 (1806)); Union Pacific Ry. Co, 231 U.S. at 202 (citing Sohn, 84 U.S. at 599-
600)).
415. H. Rep. No. 101-734 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6870.
416. 28 U.S.C. §1658 (1990).
417. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6870.
418. Lampfv. Gilbertson, 111 . Ct. 2773,2782 n.10 (1991).
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Court's failure to engage in this analysis of congressional intent does
not prevent Congress from correcting the error and ensuring that its
intent is effected. Thus, Congress would be well within its authority
to pass a statute effecting the settled policy that new limitations
periods should not be applied retroactively. Section 27A is a rational
declaration of that position, and was an appropriate exercise of
congressional power.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Lampf decision, which applied the
onelthree year limitations period of Exchange Act section 9 to
implied actions under Exchange Act section 10(b), overturned fifty
years of lower court interpretations on the issue of limitations periods
for section 10(b) actions. One of the major difficulties with the
decision was that it created a new three-year repose period, which the
Court held could not be tolled under any circumstances.4"9 Because
many potential plaintiffs do not even learn of the existence of a cause
of action until after the new three-year repose period has elapsed, the
decision places undue burdens on plaintiffs seeking to invoke federal
rights, and there is no indication Congress would have intended to
impose such burdens.
The decision is thus inconsistent with the Court's prior approach
to limitations periods, in which federal courts would apply
("borrow") the most analogous state-law limitations period unless not
doing so would place an undue burden on plaintiffs seeking to invoke
federal rights. Nonetheless, if the Court felt compelled to borrow a
limitations period from elsewhere in federal law, it could have
avoided undue burdens on plaintiffs by using the analogous antifraud
limitations period in the Commodity Exchange Act, or by borrowing
the one-year limitations period in Exchange Act section 9 but
discarding the three-year repose period.
The Court's application of the new Lampf rule to the parties
before the Court was generally construed to mean, in accordance with
the Court's contemporaneously announced Beam decision, that the
419. Id. at 2782.
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new limitations period would be applied retroactively to all pending
cases. This would have barred billions of dollars in claims that had
been timely when they were filed. Congress thus enacted section 27A
of the Exchange Act in order to deprive the Lampf decision of its
retroactive effect. That statute is constitutional, as Congress has the
power to "overrule" the Supreme Court in the area of legislation and
to enact laws reversing that Court's retroactive imposition of a new
limitations period.
However, the constitutionality of section 27A need not be
addressed, because the Lampf decision should not be applied
retroactively even without the congressional legislation. Retroactivity
of judicial decisions is related to the Blackstone theory of decision-
making, that courts "find" a law from a fixed body of laws. This
approach to judicial decisions is perceived to serve norms of stability
and equal treatment to similarly situated litigants. The Austinian
approach, that courts "make" law and not "find" it, suggests less
immutability to the rule of law and more closely resembles legis-
lation, which courts are supposed to avoid. Nonetheless, federal
courts do engage in wholly appropriate "judicial legislation" as a
means of filling interstices in federal statutory law; this may even be
a necessary concomitant of federal jurisprudence.
While courts normally apply judicial decisions retroactively as a
means of promoting stability and fairness, that approach may not
work in situations involving judicial legislation. Instead, it may
operate to create the very injustices against which retroactive
operation of new judicial decisions would normally seek to guard. A
court that enacts judicial legislation is not finding a law from a fixed
body of laws, but is making law, and should adapt its methods of
decisionmaking in accordance with that fact rather than adhering to
a fixed paradigm that loses its purpose in cases of legislation.
Thus, instead of rigidly applying doctrines of automatic retro-
activity, courts should consider applying new judicial legislation on
a prospective-only basis, for the same reasons of stability and fairness
that new Congressional legislation is usually enacted on a
prospective-only basis. Adaptation of the prospective legislative
process to the normally retrospective process of judicial decision-
making would lead to the use of the same Chevron Oil v. Huson
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standard that the Supreme Court has previously used to determine the
retroactivity of new judicial decisions. This would allow for the
flexible use of prospective application of judicial legislation, such as
the new limitations period in the Lampf decision, as a means of
avoiding injustice and irrational results.
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